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COMM
THE AUTOMOBILE INVENTORY SEARCH
AND
CADY v. DOMBROWSKI
I. INTRODUCTION
Aptly, Mr. Justice Rehnquist has noted that the law of automobile
searches "is something less than a seamless web."' No other issue arising
under the fourth amendment has caused such difficulty in reconciling the
practicalities of law enforcement and other public interests with the privacy
interests of the individual. On the one hand, the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution operates to insure the right to privacy with
the following language:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and etects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.2
This language has been interpreted to mean that in general, law enforce-
ment officers must obtain a warrant in advance in order to conduct a lawful
search. This rigid rule is subject to a number of exceptions necessitated
by a strong public interest in obviating the requirement in certain situations. 3
However, even if no warrant is required, the search must be reasonable."
1. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth am~ndment in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3. See, e.g., Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GA. L. REv. 269, 270,
277-78 & n.31 (1971) ; Comment, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles,
87 HARV. L. REv. 835, 836 & n.8 (1974). The exceptions to the warrant requirement
are usually grouped in the category of "exigent circumstances" and have included
certain sets of circumstances classified as follows: hot pursuit; destruction of evi-
dence; search incident to arrest; and the automobile search. See Player, supra, at 277
n.31 and cases cited therein.
4. Comment, supra note 3, at 835. There has been some controversy over whether
the failure to obtain a warrant when one is required will, by itself, render the search
unreasonable without further inquiry into the reasonableness of the search. See J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966); Player,
supra note 3, at 269-70. The Supreme Court has held that at least in the area of search
and seizure, a warrant is a prerequisite to a reasonable search, subject to certain
exceptions. Id. at 278, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the Supreme Court utilized this two
step analysis of reasonableness in upholding the warrantless search of the trunk of
an automobile. Id. at 442. See note 153 infra.
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One exception to the warrant clause is that of the automobile search.
Due to the fact that an automobile could be driven to another county or
state while police were securing a warrant, a warrant requirement would be
highly impractical. Consequently, the Supreme Court of the United States
has altered the application of the warrant rule to searches of vehicles by
creating the "moving vehicle exception" which allows law enforcement
officers to stop and search an automobile when they have probable cause
to believe the vehicle contains evidence or contraband. 5 With the prolifera-
tion of automobiles have come problems of public management, traffic
control, and protection of private property necessitating, greater police
contact with vehicles,.often in a noninvestigative capacity., Thus, the issue
has arisen as to whether the seizure of contraband or evidence found in the
course of a noninvestigative procedure such as an automobile inventory
search is violative of the automobile owner's fourth amendment rights.
Specifically, the questions are: 1) did the failure to obtain a warrant render
the inventory unreasonable; and 2) if no warrant was required, was the
inventory nonetheless unreasonable in light of the circumstances surround-
in- it?
The essential difference between an ordinary search and an automobile
inventory is that the latter, at least from a theoretical standpoint, is not
made for the purpose of discovering evidence or contraband. The most
commonly stated purpose of the inventory is that of protecting personal
property left inside automobiles impounded by police because of a parking
violation, the arrest of the driver, an accident, or some similar occurrence,
and to insulate the police from false claims for conversion of these items.'
5. Chambers v. Maroncy, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
6. For instance, New York City police towed away 108,332 illegally parked cars
in 1969 alone. People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 71, 272 N.E.2d 464, 465, 323 N.Y.S.2d
945, 947 (1971).
7. An extended discussion of the various justifications of the inventory search
appears in section ID infra. Since many states have statutes defining the situations
in which a car may or must be impounded, the practitioner should examine his state's
statutes as a means of determining the validity of a particular impoundment. In
Pennsylvania, for example, "abandoned" and "wrecked" vehicles may be removed to
the nearest storage area if, in the opinion of the officer, it is necessary to protect the
vehicle or its contents, under section 1222 of the Vehicle Code of 1959 [hereinafter
Vehicle Code], PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1222 (Supp. 1974). The term "abandoned
vehicle" is defined by section 102 of the Vehicle Code to be an inoperable vehicle left
unattended for 48 hours on public property; an unregistered vehicle left standing; and
a vehicle left illegally on public or private property for more than 48 hours. Id. § 201.
Officers are also permitted to impound commercial vehicles that violate weight limits.
Id. § 903. Furthermore, local governments are permitted to enact ordinances permitting
impoundment so long as approved areas of storage are designated and other procedural
elements are provided. Id. § 1103.
One court discussed the impoundment issue as follows:
Reasonable cause for impoundment may, for example, include the necessity for
removing (1) an unattended-to car illegally parked or otherwise illegally obstruct-
ing traffic; (2) an unattended-to car from the scene of an accident when the
driver is physically or mentally incapable of deciding upon steps to be taken to 2
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The inventory usually consists of a thorough examination, removal, and
listing of all items of value inside the passenger and luggage compartments,
although the process sometimes extends into the engine or into sealed
parcels.8
To date, courts in 21 states have held that an inventory into areas
of an automobile which are not in plain view 9 does not violate the fourth
amendment. 10 Although there are no cases on point, in several other
jurisdictions courts have tended to agree with this position or have ex-
pressed views in dicta which could be used to support it." At the present
time, two state courts have held unconstitutional an inventory into areas
not in plain view 12 and three others would seem to have favored this
theory.3 In four states, courts have not regarded an inventory as a search
deal with his property, as in the case of the intoxicated, mentally incapacitated
or seriously injured driver; (3) a car that has been stolen or used in the com-
mission of a crime when its retention as evidence is necessary; (4) an abandoned
car; (5) a car so mechanically defective as to be a menace to others using the
public highway; (6) a car impoundable pursuant to ordinance or statute which
provides therefore as in the case of forfeiture. The mere commission of one or
more of the 27 bailable traffic offenses listed in JTR T2.03 (m) does not necessarily
provide reasonable cause for impoundment. . . . There is even case support for
the view that if the driver cannot present his driver's license when arrested on a
traffic violation, impoundment on that account is not required.
State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 332-33, 511 P.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (Ct. App.
1973) (citations omitted).
Also relevant to the issue of impoundment are: Cotton v. United States,
371 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967) ; People v. Landa, 30 Cal. App. 3d 487, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (Ct. App. 1973) ; People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1964) ; Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123 (D.C. 1971) ; United States v.
Pannell, 256 A.2d 925 (D.C. 1969) ; Williams v. United States, 170 A.2d 233 (Mun.
Ct. App. D.C. 1961); St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 218 N.W.2d 697 (1974);
State v. Jones, 122 N.J. Super. 585, 301 A.2d 185 (Dist. Ct. 1973). See also Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) ; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1970) ;
Mestas v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 n.3 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, 7 Cal. 3d 537, 498 P.2d 977, 102 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1972).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249, 250 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) ; Jackson v. State, -_ Miss ., 243 So. 2d 396, 397 (1970).
9. Under the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize evidence or contraband
encountered inadvertently during an otherwise valid intrusion; thus, police may seize
what they observe in a car if they have a legitimate reason to be in or around the
vehicle. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971) ; Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam). Since police may seize objects in
plain view, there seems to be no reason why they would not be able to remove such
items and make a list of them as part of an inventory.
10. Those states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See Appendix Part I.
11. Those jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Michigan.
See Appendix Part II.
12. California and Oregon adhere to this position. See Appendix Part III.
13. Those states are Maine, Missouri, and South Dakota. See Appendix Part IV.
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for purposes of the fourth amendment 14 while three others have raised
this issue without resolution. 15
Federal case law in this area is more sophisticated and, yet, more
elusive. The Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal, the only ones
with holdings directly on point, are split upon the inventory issue.'6 There
is no law on point within the First, Seventh, or Tenth Circuits, 17 and the
remaining circuits are in various stages of uncertainty.'
8
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet ruled upon the
inventory issue. However, the Court in resolving related issues in the
area of automobile searches, has struggled to find the evidence or contra-
band uncovered admissible and the intrusions reasonable. 19 Unfortunately,
the Court's key opinions of the last decade display a shortsighted incre-
mentalism which has produced law of obscure basis and uncertain direction.
Because of the problems created by these decisions, the precise issue ex-
amined herein is pressing itself upon the Court.20
It is the purpose of this Comment to explore the conflicting rationales
that have been offered in support of and against the inventory search,
and to reach a conclusion upon the validity of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements in the area. In this Comment, the term "automobile inventory
search" will be limited in meaning to the search of areas within a legally
impounded automobile which are not in plain view. In Part II, the various
justifications and policy bases for the inventory search will be examined
in order to determine whether there is any substantial public interest which
would justify intrusions of this nature. Part III will discuss several im-
portant automobile search decisions from the Supreme Court of the United
States as a means of explicating the impact of the Court's most recent
decision in this area of the law, Cady v. Dombrowski.2 1
14. See Mackall v. State, 7 Md. App. 246, 255 A.2d 98 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969);
State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970)
People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971) ; State
v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).
15. See State v. All, 17 N.C. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 770 (Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) ; People v. Willis, 46 Mich. 436, 208 N.W.2d 204 (Ct.
App. 1973). In State v. Tully- ......- Conn - , ..... A.2d ....... 15 Crim. L. Rptr. 2041
(Sup. Ct. March 5, 1974), the court held that an inventory of items in plain view
was not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment. Id.
16. See Appendix Part V.
17. See Appendix Part VI.
18. See Appendix Part VII.
19. See generally section IIIA infra.
20. Although there are two issues raised by inventories - whether a warrant is
a prerequisite, and, if not, is a warrantless search reasonable under the circumstances -
the former seems to have been clearly answered in the negative by the Court in Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Consequently, the primary focus of this Com-
ment will be upon the reasonableness of an inventory assuming that a warrant is not
required. An analysis of the Dombrowski Court's opinion with respect to the warrant
issue is offered in a later portion of this Comment. See notes 162-63 & 166-70 and
accompanying text infra.
21. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
[VOL. 20
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II. THE BASES UPON WHICH INVENTORY SEARCHES
MAY BE JUSTIFIED
Since a determination of the constitutionality of an inventory search
depends ultimately upon a balancing of interests, 22 it is essential to examine
the policy arguments that have been offered to justify this procedure.
Unfortunately, courts in many cases on point merely state conclusions about
reasonableness.23  Other courts merely mention supporting factors without
examining them in depth.24 Hence, the purpose of this section is to
evaluate the various justifications that have been articulated in support of
the inventory search in the light of the individual's fourth amendment
privacy interests.
A. Is an Inventory a Search for Purposes of the Fourth Amendment?
Four jurisdictions hold that a proper inventory2 5 is not a search for
purposes of the fourth amendment.2 6 The implicit basis for such conclusions
is that the fourth amendment applies primarily, if not solely to government
intrusions which have as their purpose the discovery of crime, the seizure
of contraband, or the seizure of evidence. In the words of one court:
A search implies an examination of one's premises or person with a
view to the discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt to be used in
prosecution of a criminal action. The term implies exploratory investi-
gation or quest.2 7
In New York, there must be a direct nexus between the intrusion and an
intent to prosecute for there to be a search.2 The Supreme Court of
Nebraska has gone so far as to infer lack of intent to search from a finding
that the officer did not have cause to believe the car contained contraband. 29
22. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Unfortunately, there can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Gagnon v. State, 212 So. 2d 337 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968) ; Denson
v. State, 128 Ga. App. 456, 197 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. Ga. 1973).
24. See, e.g., Mackall v. State, 7 Md. App. 246, 255 A.2d 98 (Ct. Spec. App.
1969); People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
25. Such an inventory would be one made of a lawfully impounded car (see note 7
supra) pursuant to a routine, administrative procedure, not as a subterfuge to search
for evidence. State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912
(1970). Apparently, the presence or absence of subterfuge turns upon the subjective
intentions of the officer making the inventory. The distinction required to be made by
this formulation is not only an exceedingly difficult one, it is also of questionable
importance. See notes 30-34 & 55-56 and accompanying text infra.
26. See the cases cited in note 14 supra.
27. Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957).
28. People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 272 N.E.2d 464, 469, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945,
952 (1971), citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art. 1, § SS 1.01,
subd. [1] (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970).
29. State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912
(1970).
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Thus, in these jurisdictions a routine inventory procedure designed to pro-
tect private property or to insulate the police from tort claims after legal
seizure of an automobile has not been regarded as a search under the fourth
amendment.
Placing aside for the moment the obvious problem of having an in-
dividual's constitutional rights turn upon the intent and motives of a police-
man, there are several objections to this theory. First, if police were to
have wide discretion over which automobiles could be impounded, "inven-
tories" could eliminate the need for "searches." Second, it is very difficult
to prove subterfuge when an administrative procedure is often assumed
to be reasonable by the courts. 30 Third, even if no bad faith or adminis-
trative sleight-of-hand is present, only those who were suspected of criminal
activity at the time of the search would have a fourth amendment right
to privacy with respect to the interior of their automobiles. As the Supreme
Court of the United States stated in another context, "It is surely anomalous
to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by
the fourth amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior."3 1
Additionally, the New York view implies that the purpose of the
fourth amendment is not to protect a citizen's privacy, but only to insulate
him from unreasonable searches for evidence or contraband.3 2  Simply
from a policy standpoint, it would seem wise to have constitutional limita-
tions upon the sovereign's right to invade, record, and reveal objects
relating to an individual's private life regardless of the purpose of the
invasion. The Supreme Court, when it has spoken to the issue, has broadly
interpreted the purpose of the fourth amendment in order to protect the
individual's privacy.33
As noted previously, the New York rule requires that the definition
of a search depend upon the motives of the officer involved, rather than
the actions and intrusions that are actually undertaken. It can be questioned
whether or not the searching officer's purpose should matter when both
30. Cf. Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE
L.J. 521, 537-38 (1968).
31. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (housing inspections
are searches under the fourth amendment). See also Comment, supra note 3, at 849-50.
32. The court in Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Va. 1974),
commented upon this theory as follows:
There have been decisions finding inventory procedures to be other than "searches"
on the theories that there is no intent to seize anything or that there is in these
situations no "reason" to search or expectation that criminal evidence will be
discovered .... It is not the intent to seize incriminating evidence which makes
governmental intrusions into private effects obnoxious in a free society, but the
simple fact of intrusion itself under power of the state.
Id. at 693 (citations and footnote omitted).
33. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), wherein the Court
stated, "The basic purpose of the Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of
this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials." Id. at 528.
[VOL. 20
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the inventory and the search proceed in the same manner and have the same
result - seizure of any evidence or contraband in the vehicle. For example,
in the stop-and-frisk and housing inspection areas, the issue of whether
or not the fourth amendment applies has turned not upon the purpose, but
rather upon the scope of the intrusion into privacy interests; the purpose
of the intrusion was relevant to its reasonableness.3 4 Thus, the contention
that an inventory is not a search because of its purpose, rather than its
scope, is contrary to both reason and Supreme Court precedent.
34. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 527 (1967), the Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that because of its beneficial purpose, a housing inspection should
not be considered a search for purposes of the fourth amendment by stating, "[I]nspec-
tions of the kind we are here considering do in fact jeopardize 'self-protection' interests
of the property owner." Id. at 531. Although the Court held that a warrant was
required for a housing inspection, it also said that "[where considerations of health
and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause'
to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an
inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken." Id. at 538, quoting
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Court, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), labelled the argument that a
stop is not a seizure and a frisk is not a search as "fantastic" and a "sheer torture of
the English language" in view of what these procedures entail. Id. at 16. According
to the Court:
[T]he sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all
instrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope
of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central
element in the analysis of reasonableness.
Id. at 17 n.15. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 693 & n.2 (E.D.
Va. 1974).
See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), wherein the court stated:
Distinction between "inspection" and "search" of a home has no basis in semantics,
in constitutional history, or in reason. "Inspect" means to look at, and "search"
means to look for. To say that the people, in requiring adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, meant to restrict invasion of their homes if government officials
were looking for something, but not to restrict it if the officials were merely
looking, is to ascribe to the electorate of that day and to the several legislatures
and the Congress a degree of irrationality not otherwise observable in their deal-
ings with potential tyranny.
178 F.2d at 18.
But cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), where the Court ruled that
a required visit by a welfare worker to the home of a client was not a search for
purposes of the fourth amendment, but if a search, the intrusion was reasonable. The
Court regarded the rehabilitative purpose of the visit as outweighing its acknowledged
investigative aspects. Id. at 317-24. Camara was distinguished as a case arising in a
criminal context (the defendant committed a misdemeanor by refusing a warrantless
entry by the housing inspector) while in Wyman, the client was merely losing her wel-
fare benefits. Id. at 325. Wyman indicates that the Burger Court views this area in a
somewhat different light than did the Warren Court, which decided Terry and Camara.
The impact of Wyman upon the question of whether an inventory is a search
was discussed recently in Cabbler v. Superintandent, supra. The Cabbler Court read
Wyman as requiring that an intrusion must be "compelled" in order for the intrusion
to be termed a search. Since the "element of compulsion [was] undisputed," the
court believed that the inventory was a search under Wyman. Id. at 695.
COMNMENT
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B. Can the Inventory Search Be Justified Upon the Basis That the
Owner's Right to Privacy Is Diluted When the Fourth Amendment
Is Applied to Automobiles?
Granting that an inventory may be considered a search, the argument
could nevertheless be made that fourth amendment principles apply dif-
ferently to automobiles. Several cases present this view, as well as the
notion that an individual's right to privacy in his car is inherently different
from (and less than) that in his home.3 5 Discussions leading in this direction
have generally proceeded in a somewhat surreptitious manner because the
Supreme Court has ruled, in Katz v. United States,86 that the fourth
amendment protects those places or things which one has a reasonable
expectation of keeping private.3 7 And it is clear that the fourth amendment
does apply to automobiles.38
In light of Katz, it is submitted that an analysis of the inventory issue
based upon the thesis that there exist varying degrees of the right of
privacy is inappropriate because such an undertaking ignores the factual
circumstances that give rise to conclusions that automobile searches are
reasonable. The individual possesses a right under the fourth amendment
to be free from unreasonable searches, whatever the area to be searched.3
However, the frequency with which an unreasonable search occurs is less
in some areas, such as the automobile, because given their peculiar at-
tributes, there is a greater probability- that circumstances will arise that
will justify a search. Hence, because of the high probability that when an
automobile search is made, circumstances will dictate that it is a reasonable
search, the proper characterization of the owner's fourth amendment rights
in his vehicle is that his expectation of privacy is less, rather than his
35. One court seemed to express this view as follows:
The fundamental right of privacy connected with a man's home is understandably
different and in greater need of protection than an automobile on the public right
of way. In the latter case the police and other people using the public highway
as well as the owner of the vehicle, have an interest which must be protected.
Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 104, 423 P.2d 666, 668 (1967), aff'd on other grounds,
429 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1970).
Another court has emphasized mobility as a ground for distinction:
A motor vehicle has been afforded some of the protections against "unreasonable"
searches that traditionally were allowed to a man's home. Yet the vehicle is still
a chattel. Given its high mobility it may be left by the owner in places where its
presence conflicts with public and private rights of others; and what may be done
with it by public authority depends ultimately on a balancing of conflicting com-
munity and personal interests.
People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 72, 272 N.E.2d 464, 465, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947
(1971). See Commonwealth v. Navarro - --- Mass. App ...... , 310 N.E.2d 372, 376
(1974) (interpreting to this effect Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. Id. at 351-52.
38. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 414 U.S. 433, 439 (1973), where the Supreme
Court stated that vehicles are "effects" under the fourth amendment.
39. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 20
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right to privacy - protection against unreasonable searches - is less. 40
For example, in Carroll v. United States,41 a warrantless search made with
probable cause was deemed reasonable due to the possibility that the vehicle
could have been removed from the control of the searching officers. 42 The
basis for justifying the search was not that the theoretical right against
unreasonable searches was diminished because an automobile was'involved:
rather, the circumstances were such that the search was reasonable.43 In
order to limit the extent of the expectation of privacy when an individual's
automobile is impounded, an examination of the surrounding circumstances
must be made to determine when and if an inventory is reasonable. To
proceed upon a theory that the owner's fourth amendment rights in his
automobile are diluted is to assume the very conclusion that is trying to
be reached.
Moreover, the difficulty encountered in diluting the fourth amendment
for automobile searches is the momentum driving one toward a use of
degrees in describing the right to privacy. For example, one might have
differing rights to privacy in the vehicle identification number, in an object
on the front seat, in one under the seat, and in one inside a suitcase located
in the trunk. Essentially, the courts would be entering a quagmire by
substituting an analysis based upon dilution of the right to privacy for a
theory based upon expectation of privacy. Nonetheless, it would appear
that the Supreme Court is considering this line of thought. 44
C. Is Mere Custody of an Impounded Automobile Sufficient Justification
for an Inventory Search?
One factor present in the inventory situation that might tend to estab-
lish the reasonableness of the search is police possession of the vehicle.
Virtually all courts which allow inventory searches require that police have
40. For example, the Supreme Court recently ruled that scraping paint from the
exterior of a car, with probable cause to believe the car had been involved in an
accident, did not violate the defendant's right to privacy, if in fact such an interest
existed in the exterior of the car. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). The
plurality stated :
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view. . . . This is not to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has
Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of
course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion.
Id. at 590-91.
41. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
42. Id. at 156. For a discussion of this case, see notes 100-05 and accompany-
ing text infra.
43. 267 U.S. at 156.
44. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the Court voiced approval for
"community caretaking" intrusions into automobiles while generally ignoring the
privacy interests of the owner. Id. at 442-47. Failure to consider the owner's privacy
interests seems to imply a dilution of the right to privacy in automobiles rather than
a lessening of the owner's expectation of privacy. 9
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valid custody of the car. 45 However, some courts seem to emphasize the
fact of custody as if custody justifies, or is an important factor in justifying,
inventory searches. 46
The apparent basis for this idea is an undifferentiated notion that an
officer who takes custody of an automobile and its contents for protective
purposes should be able to know exactly what he is protecting. For example,
the court in People v. Sullivan47 declared:
[Defendant] could not reasonably expect the police to leave a brief
case in open sight in a storage facility or expect that they would not
make sure when they took control of the brief case what it contained
and record its contents.48
But it would seem that such a notion is inadequate to justify such an in-
vasion of privacy unless there are other factors present which weigh upon
the side of reasonableness, such as the intent to prevent tort claims by the
owner against the police or to protect the property of the individual against
theft. Since it is not necessary for police to open a briefcase, for example,
in order to protect it, the owner's right to privacy should be respected.
Thus, the majority of the courts that have dealt with the issue, have ruled
that custody alone does not necessarily imply the right to search.49 But
custody, when viewed in conjunction with other factors, may make a search
reasonable.50
45. See, e.g., Boulet v. State, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168 (1973) ; United States
v. Pannell, 256 A.2d 925 (D.C. 1969).
46. In Knight v. State, 212 So. 2d 900 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968), police found
a jewelry box during an inventory. The court ruled that once the box was in the
possession of police, they could validly examine it to determine whether or not it
contained contraband. Id. at 900. It was stated by the court in Warrix v. State, 50
Wis. 2d 368, 184 N.W.2d 189 (1971), that police could make "a custodial search andinventory" of a lawfully impounded vehicle. Id. at 376, 184 N.W.2d at 194.
In deciding the question of the reasonableness vel non of an automobile search,
the Supreme Court has emphasized the fact that "the police had exercised a form
of custody or control over the [automobile]." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
442-43 (1973). Exactly what significance this fact had in Dombrowski or the other
cases cited above is not evident from the opinions. However, in these cases, the
factor of custody would seem to weigh in favor of reasonableness.
47. 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
48. Id. at 72, 272 N.E.2d at 466, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The court did not explain
why the defendant could not reasonably hold such an expectation.
49. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 710, 484 P.2d 84, 91, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 419 (1971);
People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1964). Cf. Brett v.
United States, 412 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Dodge v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285,
291 (D. Utah 1967).
50. The Supreme Court, in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) stated:
While it is true, as the lower court said, that "lawful custody of an automobiledoes not of itself dispense with constitutional requirements of searches there-
after made of it" . . . the reason for and nature of the custody may constitu-
tionally justify the search.
Id. at 61-62 (citation omitted).
For a discussion of this case, see notes 128-38 and accompanying text infra.
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D. Factors That May Justify an Inventory as a Reasonable Search
Courts which uphold inventory searches generally require that they
be made pursuant to a police regulation or a standard operating procedure,
that is, in a routine, administrative manner. 51 These courts have failed to
explain why this factor should tend to make the search reasonable. Although
doing so with less than complete uniformity, 52 they have relied upon the
existence of the routine procedure as one factor from which reasonableness
can be inferred.
53
The two most frequently cited reasons for the inventory search are
the need to protect the police against unfounded tort claims alleging that
property in an impounded auto disappeared, and the need to protect the
owner's property interest in the contents of the car.5 4 Two other justifi-
cations can be added: the inventory's usefulness as an internal investigatory
procedure to apprehend police officers who steal from impounded auto-
mobiles, and the need to protect police and the storage area from explosives
or loaded weapons possibly located inside an impounded vehicle.
In view of these alleged justifications, the apparent purpose behind
introducing evidence of a standard operating procedure to protect valuables
would seem to be to infer that the actual, subjective intention of the officer
making the inventory was something other than the desire to search for
evidence. If, however, the procedure is in itself reasonable, the officer's
thoughts and motivations, if any, would seem to be irrelevant.55 Thus, the
51. Although situations in which vehicles may be impounded are legislatively
defined(see note 7 supra), the cases on point indicate that the inventory procedure is
seldom mandated by statute or ordinance. In addition, it is unclear at what point a
procedure becomes "standard." See United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.
1972) ; State v. Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968).
52. In United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973), the court stated:
"However, we do think that the fact such a search is made pursuant to a police regu-
lation should have no bearing in determining whether the search was reasonable under
all circumstances." Id. at 476. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
the Supreme Court found unpersuasive the argument that housing inspections were
routine administrative procedures under local law. Id. at 530-31.
Clearly, an unreasonable intrusion is not made reasonable by repetition.
Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 698 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1970). If anything,
frequency makes it even more pernicious since both perpetrators and victims assume
validity from general practice.
53. E.g., United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1972); State v.
Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 389-90, 438 P.2d 571, 574 (1968).
54. See, e.g., People v. Trusty -.... Colo ....... , 516 P.2d 423, 426 (1973); Cabbler
v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 570, 184 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1073 (1972).
55. A related conceptual problem arises from those cases which uphold an in-
trusion as a search with probable cause and alternatively as a valid inventory with-
out subterfuge. See United States v. Boyd, 436 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); United States v. Smith, 340 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1972). In a some-
what analogous situation, an officer testified that he had searched a car seeking valu-
ables, weapons, and identification of the car in United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d
249, 250-51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). A gun was found in the
glove compartment. The court ruled that a search for weapons would have been
unconstitutional, but upheld the search as an inventory, stating that the protection
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focus of the inquiry should be upon the need for the intrusion, its scope,
and the surrounding circumstances.56 It is the intention of this section of
the Comment to demonstrate that in most cases, an inventory is not justified
by those factors described.
Since police have an ill-defined duty under bailment law to afford
some kind of protection to property that comes into their possession
5 7 it
is arguable that an inventory is necessary to protect police from possible
claims of conversion if the property is lost or stolen. However, it is
submitted that this theory is more rhetoric than substance. Although a
few courts speak of citizen complaints in a general way,5 s no reported
of the owner's property "was clearly the real purpose of the inventory here under-
taken, which uncovered the pistol." 441 F.2d at 252.
It would appear that one could not allege the existence of probable cause and
the conduct of a valid inventory consistently: if an officer has probable cause to believe
an automobile contains evidence or contraband, it is doubtful that his purpose in
making a search would be to protect valuables. Thus, where subjective intention
determines whether subterfuge exists, the slightest hint of reason to believe the car
contains contraband or evidence should invalidate the warrantless search as an inven-
tory. Of course, the search may still satisfy the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment under the automobile exception, provided the requisite circumstances are present.
See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
56. As the court in Boulet v. State, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168 (1973), stated:
We believe that there has been unnecessary confusion caused by insisting
upon an either/or requirement as to the motives for inventorying the contents of
the automobile. It is unrealistic to require that in justifying the inventory search
the police must affirm that they had no hope or expectation of finding something
incriminating. What makes an inventory search reasonable under the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment is not that the subjective motives of the police
were simplistically pure, but whether the facts of the situation indicate that an
inventory is reasonable under the circumstances.
Id. at 435, 511 P.2d at 170.
57. When police impound a vehicle, they may be deemed gratuitous bailees of
the vehicle and its contents. Gratuitous bailees have been defined as those who care
for another's goods or perform some service with respect to them gratuitously. R.
BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 328 (2d ed. 1955). The duty of a gratuitous
bailee with respect to the items in his possession is not altogether clear. The tra-
ditional view, and the one still held by many courts, is that a gratuitous bailee is only
liable to the owner if the goods are damaged or lost through his gross negligence.
Id. at 328-29. A recent trend has been to redefine gross negligence as a lack of
ordinary care in view of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 331-35.
Police might also be considered to be involuntary bailees, that is, those who
come into possession of another's goods inadvertently, by mistake, or because of
necessity without a contract with the owner. Involuntary bailees are obliged to use
ordinary care when in possession of the goods but are only liable for negligent mis-
delivery. See generally id. 399-415.
58. In Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972), the court observed:
In 1964 or 1965, however, complaints were made and claims for reimbursement
filed by the owners of vehicles who claimed property was lost or stolen while
their cars were so stored. The procedure for removal, inventory and separate
storage of the contents of vehicles in safekeeping was instituted then in an effort
to prevent theft or loss of property from stored vehicles.
212 Va. at 522, 184 S.E.2d at 782.
Another court has remarked:
Many times claims against the police have been made by the accused that per-
sonal property had disappeared from his car while he and the car were in police
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inventory search case to date has cited a specific instance of police liability
for goods left in a car that has been impounded. 59 In the only case
to consider the bailment issue in depth, Mozzetti v. Superior Court,60
the Supreme Court of California concluded that the police were, at most,
involuntary bailees 6' whose required standard of care could be fulfilled
by rolling up the windows and locking the doors.62 Other courts have
addressed the issue by reasoning that fewer questions will be raised if police
do not search sealed parcels. 63
It is not the intention of this Comment to meander through the in-
tricacies of bailment law, which varies from state to state, if not from court
to court.64 But it would seem that the false specter of tort liability, canted
blindly in case after case, should not outweigh the individual's fourth
amendment right to privacy. It is submitted that the threat of successful
tort suits is minimal because the claimant has the difficult burden of
proving: 1) that the goods allegedly stolen were in the auto at the time of
impoundment; and 2) a violation of the appropriate standard of care by
police. 5 As one court said:
The dangers of false claims prevailing under these circumstances,
while not nonexistent, are sufficiently minute to make the sacrifice of
constitutionally protected interests for the purpose of further diminish-
ing those dangers patently unreasonable. 66
If, on the other hand, the concern is not the probability of successful
suits, but either the burden imposed in defending spurious ones or the
desire to prevent allegations against police, then it can be argued that such
claims can be made despite the inventory procedure. For example, one
could allege that the officer who made the inventory converted goods which
custody. To protect the police from such claims, a custodial search and inventory
may be made of the personal property in a car which can be easily removed.
Warrix v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 368, 376, 184 N.W.2d 189, 194 (1971).
59. Noting this remarkable phenomenon was the Deleware Supreme Court in
State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. 1973) :
Moreover, the probability of civil liability on the part of a police officer, for loss
or theft of property during impoundment of an automobile, is unsupported by ex-
perience; the State is unable to cite any example of such liability, here or elsewhere.
Id. at 294.
60. 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971) (en banc).
61. See note 57 supra.
62. Id. at 708, 484 P.2d at 89-90, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18. See United States v.
Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 475-76 (8th Cir. 1973). But see St. Paul v. Myles, 298
Minn. 298, 218 N.W.2d 697 (1974), where the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated
that merely locking up the automobile might not protect the city from liability if the
contents were stolen, because the city would have the burden of showing it was not
negligent. Id. at 300 & n.1, 218 N.W.2d at 699 & n.1.
63. See Dodge v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285, 291 (D. Utah 1967) ; State v. Gwinn,
301 A.2d 291, 294 (Del. 1973). In the latter case, the Delaware Supreme Court
instituted a judicial rule: "[T]he police officer will be protected henceforth by the
law of this case holding that he has no duty under the law to open closed baggage in
order to secure its contents." Id. at 294.
64. See R. BROWN, supra note 57, at 319-26, 399-415.
65. See generally id. at 257-69.
66. Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 700 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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were inside the car. In any event, the public interest in minimizing suits
against the municipality could be better served by imposing a judicial rule,
similar to the one in State v. Gwinn,67 to the effect that police officers will
not be liable for conversion if property is lost or stolen because the officers
did not search closed areas or packages. 68
Closely related to the argument that inventories are necessary to
protect police against claims of conversion of property left inside impounded
automobiles is the contention that an inventory is reasonable because it is
the most effective means of safeguarding this property. The emphasis is
not upon the protection of the police, but upon the protection of the owner.
It seems reasonable to assume that most people realize that automobiles
are rather vulnerable to the skilled or determined thief and, as a result,
do not willingly leave items of great value in an unattended auto for long
periods of time for fear of theft. As one court noted, "It is not unusual for
items to disappear from parked vehicles in this jurisdiction, in spite of well
lit parking lots and locked doors." 69
However, the desire to protect the property of the owner of the im-
pounded automobile should not be the sole consideration in examining the
constitutional validity of an inventory - it is merely a factor to be used
in determining what is an unreasonable invasion of one's privacy. The
reasonableness of the inventory depends upon all surrounding circumstances.
In Terry v. OhioT° the Supreme Court of the United States said:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amend-
ment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal
security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in the light
of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of
reasonableness. 71
This language suggests that in determining the reasonableness of the use
of an inventory procedure to protect property located in impounded vehicles,
a court must consider the available alternative methods of protection in-
volving less intrusion into the privacy interests of the owner.7 2
67. 301 A.2d 291 (Del. 1973).
68. See note 63 supra. Such a rule might be legislatively prescribed as well. In
Pennsylvania, for example, officers who remove unattended, abandoned, or wrecked
vehicles to nearby storage areas under section 1222 of the Vehicle Code are not liable
for damage or loss of contents of the vehicle. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1222
(Supp. 1974).
69. United States v. Fuller, 277 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, 433 F.2d
533 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
70. 392 U.S.1 (1968).
71. Id. at 17-18 n.15. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 527 (1967),
where the Supreme Court found that the intrusion of a housing inspection was a
search requiring a warrant, despite the obviously laudable purpose and routine nature
of the procedure. Id. at 520.
72. Thus, the opening of packages found inside an automobile would entail a
wider scope of search than merely peering into the windows. Although the material
quoted refers to "personal security" (see text accompanying note 64 supra) and the
Terry case involved a stop and frisk, the principle is applicable here, since an in-
dividual's right to privacy in the interior of his automobile is not any less than in
other areas. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
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Upon this basis, it would seem that the additional safety that is afforded
when police rummage through luggage and closed parcels is not justified
in view of the fact that these items could be protected adequately without
police knowing their contents by leaving them inside the car or by storing
them elsewhere.73 Such a search should, therefore, be held unreasonable.7 4
With respect to the mere removal of items located in closed areas of the
impounded automobile, a strong argument may be made for the reason-
ableness of such a limited inventory procedure. The apparent alternative
would be to provide constant guard over the lots where the impounded
vehicles are stored - a method which may often. prove to be impractical
in terms of police manpower and resources that must be expended. 7 5 Con-
sequently, police would not only be able to remove items that they observed
in plain view, but would also be able to search the entire vehicle, including
the trunk, under the theory that such is necessary to protect the owner's
property.7 6
This conclusion may be challenged upon the basis that those who drive
automobiles and carry valuables must be deemed to assume some risk of
theft. Although owners have a right to expect some police protection over
unattended vehicles, they can hardly expect any added protection, such as
an inventory would provide, when they increase the risk of theft by afford-
ing the police cause to impound. 77 As a result, because an individual who
is to be away from his car for a period of time can do no more than roll up
the windows and lock the doors, it would seem reasonable, in view of the
73. The possible existence of explosives and other dangerous devices in these
locations presents a slightly different issue and is therefore discussed elsewhere in this
Comment. See notes 82-89 and accompanying text infra.
74. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
75. The place where impounded vehicles are stored would be one factor in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the procedures followed. For example, a lot located in
an isolated area away from police activity would weigh in favor of opening the car
and removing all contents. On the other hand, if the automobile is kept in a police
garage where the danger of theft is lessened, there would be more reason to declare
the procedure unreasonable.
76. In State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. 1973), police arrested defendant for
drunken driving. Before his car was towed and impounded, police made an inventory
pursuant to standard procedure. A closed satchel was found in the trunk; it was
opened and marijuana discovered inside. Id. at 292-93. The court stated that the
inventory of the interior of the automobile, including the trunk, was a reasonable
search, and the seizure of the satchel was valid because it was in plain view. How-
ever, the court held that the evidence found inside was inadmissible because the search
of the contents of the satchel was not necessary to the otherwise valid purpose of
the inventory. Id. at 293-94.
77. See note 7 supra. For example, an owner who illegally parks assumes the
risk that his vehicle will be towed and therefore not be subject to his control for a
period longer than that which would have elapsed had he properly parked his car.
While it may be argued that he has the right to expect protection when it is im-
pounded, it hardly seems equitable to require police to remove objects, especially
when no such protection would have been offered had he parked legally.
COMMENT
15
Hall: The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski
Published by Villanova University Charles Widg r School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
individual's privacy interests, to limit police to the same "precautions" after
the automobile is impounded. 78
Such a conclusion necessarily prefers the individual's privacy interests
over the possibility of his pecuniary loss. In so doing, it is consistent with
the primary purpose of the fourth amendment - to protect privacy.79 The
landmark decisions in which warrantless searches were found to be reason-
able 0 were based not upon the necessity of safeguarding individual pecu-
niary interests, but upon such considerations as the impracticality of
obtaining a warrant to seize contraband that an officer had probable cause
to believe was located in a movable vehicle,81 the prevention of harm to
an arresting officer from weapons possibly located near the suspect,8 2 and
the possible destruction of evidence within the suspect's immediate area of
control.8 3 In addition, these considerations justified searches of the person
and surroundings of a suspect alleged to be committing or to have com-
mitted a crime. In contrast, the inventory search is used to protect the
property of a potential victim against possible future theft. Not only is the
existence of a crime much more speculative under the property justification
for the inventory, it is the potential victim, rather than the suspect, whose
privacy interests are infringed.
As a result, it would seem that the reasons of public policy used to
justify warrantless searches are not applicable to the inventory procedure.
The failure to conduct a search affects only the owner and the safety of his
property.8 4 Should the owner value his property more than his privacy,
he is free to consent to an inventory by waiving his fourth amendment
rights.85
The automobile inventory search is a very effective means of achieving
a worthy goal - protecting property in vehicles impounded by police. But
78. In United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973), and Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971), the courts be-
lieved that this was all that was necessary on the part of the police. 487 F.2d at 477;
4 Cal. 3d at 709, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417. This argument presupposes an
auto with functional locks and windows. If this is not the case, more intrusive
measures to protect the owner's property may be reasonable.
79. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
80. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
81. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
82. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
83. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966).
84. As to the danger to the public of weapons or explosive devices in an im-
pounded vehicle, see notes 82-89 and accompanying text infra. Such a danger has
more bearing on the physical safety of the storage bailee or police than the property
protection justification for the inventory procedure.
85. In Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Va. 1974), the
court noted: "To the extent that the inventory is conducted for the benefit of the
owner of the vehicle, it is unclear why he cannot be asked if he wants the benefit of
such protection." Id. at 700. Of course, this position assumes that the owner is avail-
able at the time of impounding or shortly thereafter. While this may be true in some
[VOL. 20
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/5
NOVEMBER, 1974]
as the Supreme Court noted in Chimel v. California,"6 the issue is not one's
subjective feeling about the acceptability of a particular police practice:
the issue is whether the practice squares with the fourth amendment's
command of privacy in one's person and effects.8 7
Another justification for the inventory procedure is the possible use
of the inventory as an internal security device to apprehend dishonest police
officers who would violate the public trust by stealing property from im-
pounded cars.88 Essentially a make-weight, this argument can be used
as part of a flurry of reasons which, although insubstantial individually,
create enough dead weight together to tip the scales in favor of reasonable-
ness. Internal security can be achieved through other means 9 and it would
be anomalous for police to violate the individual's fourth amendment rights,
if such is the case, in order to protect him from the illegal behavior of other
police. Moreover, a dishonest inventory-taker could merely omit from the
list of effects those which he wished to steal, thus leaving the owner in the
same straits as before - dependent upon the honesty of the police. The
inventory search procedure cannot stand on so slender a reed.
The final basis upon which automobile inventories might be justified
as reasonable searches is the need to safeguard the police and public against
injury caused by explosives or weapons secreted inside luggage or closed
parts of the car. Where this contention has been raised, it has received a
generally unfavorable reception. 90 One source of support is found in United
States v. Grill9 where federal agents were certain that the defendant
had rigged an explosive device in a package that had been seized, and were
found to have acted reasonably in inspecting his luggage.92 Similarly, a
search of a vehicle under police care has been allowed when police had a
situations such as impoundment after arrest, it may not be so in others, as in the case
where an illegally parked vehicle is towed to a storage area. In these instances, it is not
possible to imply consent by the owner because consent must be voluntarily given in re-
sponse to an officer's request. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247-48 (1973).
86. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
87. Id. at 764-65.
88. This argument has not been cited in any case to date.
89. The use of "plants," infiltrators, and spot checks, in addition to citizen com-
plaints, would seem to be reasonable alternatives. To avoid tort claims for goods in
impounded automobiles, the court in Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690(E.D. Va. 1974), suggested seals upon the trunks and doors. Id. at 700. Such devices
could also be used to provide internal security.
90. See Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972), vacated on other
grounds, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168 (1973); State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291, 295
(Del. 1973).
91. 484 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1973).
92. Police arrested defendant upon a narcotics charge as he was boarding an
airplane and impounded his luggage. A previous parcel of narcotics seized in relation
to the same conspiracy had been rigged to explode if tampered with. An agent opened
the defendant's luggage before it was placed in storage to negate the danger of an
explosion and found evidence. Id. at 991. The court cited this danger of explosives
affirmatively in upholding the inventory. Id.
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reasonable belief that the automobile contained a weapon. 93 Yet in United
States v. Gravitt,94 where the police unexpectedly found a veritable arsenal
inside defendant's automobile, 95 the court used the rationale of the potential
of theft and tort claims to support a conclusion of reasonableness, rather
than an argument based upon the presence of explosives and weapons,
to uphold the inventory.9 6
In the absence of some basis for a belief that a car contains weapons
or devices capable of imminent explosion, it would seem that such risks
are so remote that an infringement of fourth amendment rights is not war-
ranted.9 7 The fourth amendment should not bow for imagination alone.
E. Summary
Although some courts have taken a contrary position,9 8 inventories
cannot be blanketly justified by the argument that they are not searches
under the fourth amendment. Neither can the facts that an automobile is
the area to be searched, nor that police have custody of the vehicle afford
sufficient grounds for concluding that inventories are a fortiori reasonable
searches. The validity of an inventory, as with any search, depends upon
the reasonableness of the intrusion in light of all the circumstances. In
most situations, the intention of the officers making the inventory to protect
themselves and their fellow officers from tort claims, to protect the owner's
property from theft, or to protect the public from dangerous objects which
may be located in the impounded automobile, does not justify an intrusion
into closed packages found inside the vehicle, or a search into areas of the
car not in plain view. Only when the vehicle is so badly damaged that
there is no protection at all to the items left inside, or when there is some
basis for believing that it does contain dangerous objects, might an inventory
be declared reasonable.
As the next section of this Comment will demonstrate, the Supreme
Court, until recently had not in its decisions on automobile searches sug-
gested or provided any reason to conclude that inventories are valid. How-
93. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), discussed in section III-B
infra. In State v. Lund, 10 Wash. App. 709, 519 P.2d 1325 (1974), the defendant,
arrested for driving with a suspended license, informed police that the vehicle con-
tained a gun. Id. at 710, 519 P.2d at 1326. Since the car could not be locked securely
and was located upon a route used by school children, the court upheld an inventory
which revealed marijuana. Id. at 712, 519 P.2d at 1327.
94. 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
95. During the inventory, police discovered a plastic explosive bomb, a carbine,
a shot gun, and a loaded, fully-automatic rifle. 484 F.2d at 377.
96. Id. at 379-80.
97. Such a belief was found to exist in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973), and the Court upheld a search based thereupon, although it was not considered
an inventory. See notes 151 & 165 and accompanying text infra.
98. See note 14 supra.
[VOL. 20
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/5
NOVEMBER, 1974]
ever, in Cady v. Dombrowski,9 9 the Court may very well have presented
the means to lower courts by which to uphold inventories in almost every
situation.
III. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF JUSTIFICATION FOR INVENTORY
SEARCHES: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Cases Prior to Cady v. Dombrowski
For the purposes of this section, the pertinent automobile search de-
cisions by the Supreme Court will be separated into two broadly descriptive
sections: 1) The mobility rule, and 2) Noninvestigative intrusions. Supreme
Court cases in this area are, for the most part, too complex and unclear
to be fit into neat, analytical pigeonholes. However, these descriptive cate-
gories are of aid in developing two important lines of thought, which may
provide a basis for concluding that inventories are reasonable searches.
1. The Mobility Rule.
The so-called automobile exception was first enunciated in Carroll v.
United States.10 0 There, federal prohibition officers had probable cause to
believe that a car, being operated upon a highway, contained contraband
liquor. Without taking the time to secure a warrant, they stopped the car,
searched, and discovered the illegal cargo inside the seats. 101
At the time that this case reached the Supreme Court - 1925 - the
automobile was a relatively new phenomenon. Recognizing the practical law
enforcement problems presented by this technological innovation, the Su-
preme Court ruled that a warrantless search of a car might be made if there
were probable cause to believe that it contained contraband, "where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."' 0 2
While the mobility factor justified the failure to obtain the warrant,10 3 the
requirement of probable cause defined the circumstances in which such
a warrantless search would be reasonable. 0 4 This standard of probable
cause and mobility for warrantless automobile searches is an attractive rule
99. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
100. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
101. Id. at 134-36.
102. Id. at 153.
103. The Carroll Court stated:
Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally trans-
ported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant,
we come now to consider under what circumstances such search may be made.
Id.
104. Id. at 156.
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in that it is easily applied and fairly clear cut. 105 However, subsequent
cases have tended to erode these requirements. 10 6
In Preston v. United States,107 the defendants were arrested for
vagrancy and their car was impounded, taken first to the police station and
then to a garage.10 8 The Supreme Court held the search unreasonable
because it could not be justified as one incident to arrest: "Once an accused
is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without
warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest."' 0 In addition, the Court
considered and rejected the contention that because there had been probable
cause to believe the car was stolen both before and after it was impounded,
the later search was valid. 011
Perhaps more significant is the fact that the Preston Court looked
to the general language of the fourth amendment rather than the more
specific demands of Carroll, in determining the validity of the automobile
search in question."' Unfortunately, subsequent cases have read Preston
narrowly by limiting it to a situation involving a search incident to arrest."'
105. Had the search in Carroll been found unreasonable, the Court stated that the
contraband seized would be inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule and
the officer would be liable for damages under a specific federal statute that existed
at the time.
The exclusionary rule, unlike the warrant requirement, does not directly
protect the privacy interests of the individual. The warrant requirement prevents
searches which would unreasonably intrude on an individual's privacy interests. The
exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is merely a remedy that can be used when such
an unreasonable search uncovers evidence or contraband. If nothing incriminating is
found, the aggrieved individual may have a tort action against police, in the absence
of a specific statute, under the implied right of action for breaches of the fourth amend-
ment which was announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). In general, however, this remedy has proved ineffective. See, e.g., Spiotto,
Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alterna-
tives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243, 269-72 (1973). Also it is conceivable that what is
found in a search may influence a court's judgment of whether or not there was
probable cause for the search.
106. It was ruled that an automobile did not have to be in motion at the time it
was seized. See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (engine running but
car not in motion) ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (seizure just after
defendant parked and exited his auto). More recent cases have stretched these con-
cepts to the breaking point. See notes 117-21 and accompanying text infra.
107. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
108. Id. at 365.
109. Id. at 367, citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 31 (1925).
110. The Court stated:
Here, we may assume, as the Government urges, that either because the arrests
were valid or because the police had probable cause to think the car stolen, the
police had the right to search the car when they first came upon the scene. But
this does not decide the question of the reasonableness of a search of a later time
and at another place.
376 U.S. at 367-68.
111. "But even in the case of motor cars, the test still is, was the search unrea-
sonable." Id. at 367.
112. See notes 116, 130, and accompanying text infra. Finally, in Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), Preston was explicitly limited. See note 156 and
accompanying text infra. But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971),
where four members of the Court read Preston broadly to preclude the warrantless
search of an automobile at another time and place, although founded upon probable
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In the next relevant Supreme Court case, Chambers v. Maroney,11
police had stopped defendant's car and arrested him as a robbery suspect.
The car had been taken to the station where a search revealed evidence.1 1 4
Initially, the Court noted that probable cause to search the auto for guns
and stolen money had existed at the time of the initial stop," 5 and upon
this basis distinguished Preston as a case concerned with search incident to
arrest. 1 6
Upholding the warrantless search, the Chambers Court stated:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause
issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate
search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 117
This passage appears at first to be merely a restatement of the Carroll
doctrine - with probable cause, police may stop a moving vehicle and
make an immediate search without a warrant -- with the addition that
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime, rather than contraband,
is located in the vehicle will provide sufficient justification for a search.
But according to Justice White, the author of the majority opinion in
Chambers, "moving" meant potentially movable" s and "immediate" meant
sometime soon after the car was impounded and removed to the station-
house." 9 Only upon this basis was it possible for the Court to find that
defendant's automobile was mobile even after impoundment.12 0 Thus, by
cause. Id. at 457 (plurality opinion, Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J.,
joining).
113. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
114. Id. at 44.
115. Id. at 48.
116. Id. at 50. Unlike Preston, the police in Chambers had probable cause to
believe the car contained evidence or contraband. Id. at 48. This distinction, appar-
ently, allowed the Chambers Court to justify a search at another time and place.
Id. at 52.
117. Id. at 52.
118. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 525-27 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting).
119. In Chambers, the "immediate" search took place after the car was towed to
the station house - a delay of indeterminate length. However, Mr. Justice White
noted in a subsequent decision that Chambers "contemplated some expedition in com-
pleting the searches so that the automobiles could be released and returned to their
owners." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 523 (1971) (White, J., dis-
senting). Justice White indicated that since the police retained defendant's car in
custody for over a year, the search in Coolidge was not sufficiently immediate under
the rule of Chambers. Id. at 523.
120. 399 U.S. at 52. There are certain inconsistencies to the normal interpreta-
tion of mobility. One does not search a vehicle while it is moving, obviously, but
only after it has been stopped. If one were to follow logically the rationale for exempt-
ing the automobile search from the warrant requirement, once an automobile has been
stopped, or seized, by police, it is no longer mobile, and hence a warrant should be
obtained. This is, apparently, the logical inconsistency which sparked Justice White's
redefinition of terms. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 524-27 (1971)
(White, J., dissenting).
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redefining the terms used in the traditional moving vehicle exception, the
Chambers Court significantly increased the number of situations and
expanded the time period within which a vehicle may be searched without a
warrant.121
The final case to be considered in this category hardly clarified the
issues raised in the previous automobile cases. After the defendant had
been arrested and his family moved to another town, police in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire2 2 seized defendant's automobile from his home, removed
it to the police station, and searched it without a valid warrant. 123 In a
split decision, the Supreme Court ruled that absent exigent circumstances,
police are required to obtain a warrant before seizing and searching a
vehicle.'2 4 The plurality distinguished Chambers as having been a case
involving a warrantless search with probable cause given a valid seizure
at another time and place - the issue in Coolidge was characterized as being
one of the validity of the warrantless seizure, and subsequent search of an
unattended automobile upon private property. 125 In view of the closeness
of the decision and the altered personnel of the Supreme Court, 26 it is
questionable what, if any, limitation Coolidge has engrafted upon the ex-
panded mobility rule enunciated in Chambers.127
Arguably, the mobility requirement has become sufficiently attenuated
or fictionalized under Chambers to include the inventory search of an im-
pounded automobile. However, Chambers requires probable cause to be-
lieve the vehicle contains evidence or contraband. Since the inventory
procedure is inconsistent with the presence of probable cause, this line of
Supreme Court cases does not support the inventory search.
121. This expansion of the mobility rule can be criticized because the practical
exigencies justifying the search in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(see notes 102-03 and accompanying text supra) are not present when a vehicle is
in police custody. If police were permitted to retain such a vehicle until a warrant
were applied for, dual interests would be served - evidence or contraband would be
preserved while the owner's privacy interests would be protected. Should the owner
value his time more than his privacy, he could consent to the search.
122. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
123. Id. at 446-48. The Court declared that although the search warrant had been
issued by a justice of the peace, it had not been issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate because the issuer was also the chief investigative officer and prosecutor.
Id. at 453.
124. Mr. Justice Harlan reluctantly concurred with the four-man plurality upon
this point while noting his desire to overthrow the exclusionary rule. Id. at 491-92
(Harlan, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 463 n.20.
126. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took Mr. Justice Harlan's place on the Court. It
should be remembered that Mr. Justice Harlan had concurred with the plurality
in Coolidge.
127. The contention was made in Coolidge that the car was still mobile although
the owner was under arrest, his family was several miles away, and officers were
guarding the automobile, because someone who possessed keys could slip by the guards
and drive away. The plurality replied, "We attach no constitutional significance to
this type of mobility." 403 U.S. at 461 n.18. 22
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2. Noninvestigative Intrusions
A second line of Supreme Court cases has involved searches or intru-
sions which were intended for purposes other than discovery of evidence
or contraband. Although it was not controlling, police custody of the
vehicles seemed to be a relevant factor in these decisions and therefore
may have some bearing upon the inventory issue.
Cooper v. California128 involved a defendant who was arrested upon
a narcotics charge as he was about to enter his automobile. The vehicle
was seized as evidence pursuant to a forfeiture statute.129  The search,
which occurred one week after the seizure, was upheld.1 30 The Court noted
that although lawful custody does not create the right to search, "[t]he
reason for and nature of the custody may constitutionally justify the
search." 1 3  The apparent holding was that a search is reasonable if con-
ducted for purposes relevant to the offense for which the defendant was
arrested (narcotics), the grounds upon which the car was impounded
(transporting narcotics), and the purpose for which it was being held
(as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding). 132
Apparently referring to the possibility of tort liability or physical in-
jury, the Court stated, "It would be unreasonable to hold that the police,
having to retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no
right, even for their own protection, to search it." 1 33 Avoiding the con-
tention that a warrant should have been obtained, the Court declared that
the issue was the reasonableness of the search rather than the opportunity
to obtain a warrant.' 3 4
128. 386 U.S.58 (1967).
129. Id. at 60. Law of June 23, 1955, ch. 1209, § 2, [19551 Cal. Stats. 2224 (re-
pealed 1967), authorized any officer making a narcotics arrest to seize any vehicle
used to conceal, transport, sell, or facilitate the possession of narcotics and required
that such a vehicle be held as evidence until forfeiture or release. Id.
130. 386 U.S. at 62. The Cooper Court distinguished Preston upon the basis that
in the latter case, the police had held the defendant's car gratuitously rather than as
required by law. Id. at 61.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 386 U.S. at 61-62.
134. Id. at 62, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 399 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). The
precise language of Rabinowitz quoted was, "The relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id.
However, Rabinowitz was overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
In the process, the Chimel Court rejected the passage from Rabinowitz relied upon
in Cooper, stating that the Rabinowitz argument was "founded on little more than a
subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct and not
on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests." 395 U.S. at 764-65.
This rejection was emphasized by Mr. Justice Powell writing for the majority
in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Referring
specifically to the quotation from Rabinowita, the Court said:
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of "unreasonable searches and
seizures," the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause. . . . The warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment is not dead language. . . . It is not an inconvenience to be somehow
"weighed" against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an im-
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Cooper's primary significance derives from the fact that the Supreme
Court allowed a warrantless search without probable cause of an im-
mobilized vehicle. Since the self-protection and custodial interests of police
were emphasized, it is possible to interpret Cooper as allowing searches
whenever police have a right to possess a vehicle.'1 5 However, such a
broad reading ignores the fact that the nature of the custody in Cooper
was somewhat unique. There, the automobile was held as evidence, subject
to forfeiture and sale by the state. These circumstances differ quantitatively
and qualitatively from those of a vehicle impounded for the convenience
of the owner, a parking violation, or the like. 18 6 Recognizing this difference,
the Supreme Court apparently narrowed its holding, perhaps to the facts
of the case.' 3 7 As a result, Cooper cannot be said to justify the inventory
procedure although it arguably: did recognize the type of custodial and
self-protection interests that are sometimes used to uphold inventories. 1 38
Subsequent to Cooper the Supreme Court narrowly avoided the in-
ventory issue although presented with a factual situation in which it might
have attempted to give some direction to the lower courts to aid them in re-
solving the question. In Harris v. United States,'s 9 police made an inven-
tory search of a car impounded as evidence pursuant to a police regulation.
Finding nothing of significance during the inventory, the officer opened
another door in order to roll up the window and lock the door. During
this second procedure, evidence was discovered in the doorjamb. 1 40  The
portant working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of
course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers"
who are a part of any system of law enforcement.
Id. at 315-16, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
As a result, it can be argued that Cooper is of questionable validity since the
justification used by the Court for not requiring a warrant was disapproved by sub-
sequent decisions. However, the Court has done nothing to indicate that it would
agree with such a contention.
It should be noted that the relevant quotation from Rabinowitz has taken on
a life of its own in the mind of Mr. Justice White. He has cited this passage affirma-
tively in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974), and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 522 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
135. See Comment, The Inventory Search of An Impounded Automobile, 48
CHI.-KENT L. Rlv. 48, 52-53 (1971).
136. The interest of police in searching a vehicle under the circumstances of
Cooper may be greater than in other fact situations. In contrast to the vehicle im-
pounded for a parking violation, an automobile seized under a forfeiture statute is
evidence; it is likely to remain in police custody for a substantial period and may,
ultimately, be sold by the state.
137. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
138. It has also been suggested that Cooper cannot apply to the inventory situa-
tion because in the latter, police cannot deny possession to the owner. Comment, supra
note 3, at 848.
139. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
.140. Id. at 235-36. The District of Columbia police regulation required a thorough
search of the vehicle's interior and the removal of all valuables. The Court of Appeals,
whose view the Supreme Court accepted, described the crucial part of the factual
situation as follows:
The arresting officer testified that he went out immediately to the car for two
purposes. One was to inventory its contents as required by the regulation, and
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Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the inventory was not at issue
since no evidence was found during the inventory, stating:
The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the
police regulation is not presented by this case. . . . [T]he discovery
of the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure
taken to protect the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in
the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in
these narrow circumstances. 1 4 1
Thus, police, as a protective measure, may roll up the windows and lock
the doors of impounded automobiles and such a procedure will not be
considered a search. Significantly, this passage could also be read to indi-
cate that the Court regarded an inventory as a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment.142
It remains to be seen whether or not this narrow rule can be expanded
to include the greater intrusion of the inventory search which is, ostensibly
for protective purposes. Arguably, the Court's justification of the intrusion
in Harris could be read as validating "protective" intrusions of unlimited
scope, such as the inventory. However, such a result would not only
infringe upon fourth amendment interests, 148 it would also conflict with
the Harris Court's apparent intention. It is submitted that had the Court
intended that Harris be interpreted as approving the inventory search, it
would not have separated the inventory from the procedure in which the
evidence was found. Rather it would have regarded locking the doors as
an aspect of a general course of conduct, that being the inventory search.1 4 .
Thus, Harris should be read merely as the application of the plain view
doctrine 14 , to a method of protecting property in police custody that in-
volved minimal intrusion upon the individual's privacy interests.
the other was to roll up the windows because it was raining. Accomplishment
of the former purpose was begun by opening the door on the driver's side of the
car; and a complete examination of the interior of the car was made through,
and by means of, this mode of entry. Having completed this examination, the
officer then went around to the other side of the car for the sole purpose of
rolling up the windows. When he opened the right front door for this purpose,
there came into his view a registration card which had been lying on the doorjamb concealed by the closed door.
Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
141. 390 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
142. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Va. 1974), where
the court read the passage quoted from Harris (see text accompanying note 141 supra)
as a refusal to reach the question of the validity of the inventory. On the other hand,
the Harris Court may have been stating that no search at all was involved in the
case, implying that the inventory was not a search. It is submitted, however, that
the Court would have made such a position clear, especially since it would have been
able to uphold the intrusion on that basis rather than the limited grounds chosen
by the Court.
143. See Section II supra.
144. See Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Wright,
J., dissenting).
145. The Harris Court stated that the officer had lawfully opened the door and
the evidence was "plainly visible." 390 U.S. at 236.
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In Harris and Cooper, the Supreme Court allowed warrantless in-
trusions of varying scope without probable cause into vehicles held in police
custody as evidence. As justifications for these decisions, the Court cited
the fact of custody, the need to protect the property of the owner, and the
self-protection interests of police. These general propositions would seem
to support the inventory search. However, this line of cases can be dis-
tinguished on three bases: 1) the holdings in both Harris and Cooper
were narrow and carefully circumscribed ;146 2) the type of custody which
allowed an intrusion of unlimited scope in Cooper does not exist in most
inventory search cases ;147 3) the interest of protecting private property
in impounded automobiles, cited in Harris, allowed an intrusion in that case
much more limited in scope than that involved in the inventory procedure.,
B. Cady v. Dombrowski 149 and its Impact upon the Inventory Issue
By a rather narrow reading of the facts and a significant extension of
the law, the Supreme Court, in Cady v. Dombrowski, was able to uphold
a warrantless search of an immobile automobile, despite the lack of probable
cause and the fact that the search was not incident to the defendant's arrest.
In the process, the Court reinterpreted several automobile search cases,
greatly limited another, created a new constitutional distinction, and, it
would seem, laid a firm basis for inventory searches if not endorsing them
sub silentio.
Initially, the fact situation of Dombrowski will be examined in order
to demonstrate the relation of this case to the inventory issue. Second,
the Dombrowski Court's treatment of previous automobile cases and its
own analysis of the facts will be explored in order to determine the possible
consequences for the inventory issue.
In Dombrowski, the defendant crashed his rented car into a bridge
abutment near West Bend, Wisconsin. Local police were summoned and
the defendant informed them that he was a Chicago policeman. The de-
fendant was subsequently arrested for drunken driving and his disabled
car was towed to a privately owned service station outside of town. After
taking defendant to a hospital, where he lapsed into an unexplained coma,
police drove to the service station to which defendant's car had been towed.
A search of defendant's car revealed evidence in the trunk which led to his
conviction for murder.150 As the Court noted:
146. See notes 132 & 141 and accompanying text supra.
147. See note 129 and accompanying text supra.
148. See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
149. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
150. 413 U.S. at 435-37. Inside the defendant's truck police found clothing, a
floor mat, and a towel covered with blood. Confronted with those items defendant,
after consulting with counsel, revealed the presence of a body at a nearby farm.
Several of the items found in defendant's trunk connected him with the killing. Defend-
ant was convicted of first degree murder upon circumstantial evidence. Id. at 437-39.
[VOL. 20
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/5
NOVEMBER, 1974]
The purpose of going to the Thunderbird, as developed on the
motion to suppress, was to look for respondent's service revolver.
Weiss [the West Bend policeman] testified that respondent did not
have a revolver when he was arrested, and that the West Bend author-
ities were under the impression that Chicago police officers were
required to carry their service revolvers at all times. He stated that
the effort to find the revolver was 'standard procedure in our depart-
ment." 5'1
It would seem that this standard procedure was actually an inventory
search.15 2 But because of the difficulties in considering the facial validity
of the inventory procedure the Court, in effect, considered the practice as
applied to the particular situation. Thus, the issue became whether the
search of an automobile under police control for a revolver was a standard
procedure "to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would
fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands" was reasonable. 153
151. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). The officer had merely a suspicion or belief
that the auto contained a gun. Id. at 436-37. Since the defendant was a policeman,
it would not necessarily have been against the law for him to have possessed a gun.
152. The Supreme Court neither accepted nor rejected this contention. Rather,
it mixed together two factors: 1) the search was part of a standard procedure of West
Bend police, id. at 443; 2) the searching officer had the specific intent to seek a re-
volver which he suspected was in defendant's rented auto, id. at 437, 433. It is possible
that the Court declined to consider the inventory issue squarely because these factors
are in partial conflict. On the one hand, the general justification for an inventory is
that of seeking and protecting valuables rather than searching for evidence or con-
traband (see note 7 and accompanying text supra); the local officer in Dombrowski
was not seeking valuables in order to protect them. Yet neither was he searching for
evidence or contraband since the defendant, a policeman, was authorized to possess
the revolver. Thus, if the Court had labelled it an inventory, it would have had to
consider not only the inventory principle, but also a refinement or hybrid form of
the principle.
While it emphasized the subjective motivations of the searching officer under
the fact situation presented, the Court was extremely vague about the nature, pur-
pose, and scope of the "standard procedure" which the officer was following. Pre-
sumably, this general procedure was not limited to protecting the public against the
weapons of drunken Chicago policemen who wreck their cars. Possibly, the procedure
was one of searching cars suspected of carrying firearms or explosives as a means
of physically protecting the storage bailee and the public. See notes 82-89 and
accompanying text supra. But such an obvious point in favor of the procedure would
have been explicated, presumably, in at least one of the four published opinions which
the case yielded along its way through the state and federal courts. See Cady v.
Dombrowski, 471 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'g, 319 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).
The Supreme Court relied heavily upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
finding of fact that the search was part of a standard procedure:
Although here there was no police regulation [requiring an inventory for valuables
of all impounded cars] similar to the one in Harris; Officer Weiss did testify
that it was "standard procedure" in his department to look in a car, being held
like the appellant's, for the service revolver. This would be a reasonable pre-
caution taken to protect the suspect's property which might be in the car.
State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d at 496, 171 N.W.2d at 354 (emphasis added). The
state court went on to hold that the procedure involved - in effect an inventory -
was not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment. Id. at 496-97, 171 N.W.2d
at 354-55.
153. The Dombrowski Court stated that in resolving this issue, it had to determine
whether the search "was unreasonable solely because the local officer had not pre-
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The Dombrowski Court began its analysis with the observation that
there is a wide range of noninvestigative situations in which local police
have contact with automobiles, labelling them "community caretaking
functions" which are unrelated to duties connected with criminal acts.1
5 4
As a result, according to the Court, there is a "constitutional difference
between searches of and seizures from houses and similar structures and
from vehicles" due to the mobility of automobiles and the fact that frequent,
noncriminal contact with vehicles by the police often results in the discovery
of contraband and evidence in plain view. 15
In this context, the Court considered its prior automobile search cases
in relation to the instant factual situation. First, the Court explicitly limited
the holding of Preston, upon which the defendant-respondent had relied.",,
The Court believed that both Cooper and Harris were dispositive of the
issues. 157 Focusing upon the purposes of the intrusions in these cases, rather
than upon their scope or necessity, the Court stated:
viously obtained a warrant," and if not unreasonable in this sense, was the resulting
warrantless search unreasonable. 413 U.S. at 442. In making these determinations,
the Court also noted that two facts should be emphasized - police had exercised a
form of custody over the automobile and the search was standard procedure. Id.
at 442-43.
154. Id. at 441.
155. Id. at 442, citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (emphasis
added). Because of the mobility of automobiles upon the open highway, the Supreme
Court has created a constitutional exception to the warrant requirement. See notes
100-05 and accompanying text supra. By using the adjective "constitutional," and
equating the caretaking duties of police with the mobility exception, the Dombrowski
Court suggested a new constitutional exception to the warrant requirement for "care-
taking" intrusions.
156. According to Justice Rehnquist:
It would be possible to interpret Preston broadly, and to argue that it stands for
the proposition that on those facts there could have been no constitutional justi-
fication advanced for the search. But we take the opinion as written, and hold
that it stands only for the proposition that the search challenged there could not
be justified as one incident to an arrest.
Id. at 444.
The Preston Court had stated that the search incident to arrest "is justified, for
example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evi-
dence of a crime . . . ." 376 U.S. at 366 (emphasis added). It is arguable that in the
above quotation from Dombrowski the Court noted these examples and implied that
there were other justifications for a search incident to arrest. This interpretation of
Dombrowski is supported by the fact that the Court therein relied upon two cases in
which the Dombrowski Court asserted that police were searching neither for evidence-
nor weapons but rather sought to protect themselves or the owner's property, Harris and
Cooper. 413 U.S. at 445-48. Therefore, it could be argued that these other justifica-
tions for a search incident to an arrest include the protection of private property
and police interests which could be safeguarded by an inventory search. Such a
justification would necessarily extend beyond the time-place limitation of Preston
and the personal effects limitation of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
However, this extension might be justified by the quasi-administrative nature of the
procedure. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), in which a police officer
arrested an individual for unlawful possession of a revolver and apparently searched
the entire car, finding contraband. Id. at 145. The Court upheld the search of the-
vehicle as a search incident to arrest. Id. at 149.
157. 413 U.S. at 444-45.
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In Harris the justification for the initial intrusion into the vehicle
was to safeguard the owner's property, and in Cooper it was to guar-
antee the safety of the custodians. Here the justification, while different,
was as immediate and constitutionally reasonable as those in Harris
and Cooper: concern for the safety of the general public who might be
endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the
vehicle. 158
It should be noted at this point that the Court's use of Harris as an
automobile search case is questionable. In Harris, nothing was found in the
inventory search, the validity of which was therefore not at issue.159 More-
over the Court ruled that the officer's action of opening the door in order
to roll up the windows and lock the car was not a search, but merely a
procedure taken to protect the car.160 Thus, the use of Harris to support
the extensive search in Dombrowski seems inappropriate for comparative
purposes. One explanation is that the Court has reinterpreted Harris as
involving evidence found in plain view during an inventory search.' 6 '
In any event, the Court concluded that in the three factual situations
presented in Harris, Cooper, and Dombrowski .- noninvestigative intru-
sions to protect the automobile owner's property, the safety of the custo-
dians of the vehicle, and the safety of the general public from the use of
dangerous weapons stolen from an automobile - a vehicle could be searched
without a warrant.162 Significantly, these three justifications are among
those cited in support of inventories; consequently an inventory could be
considered a "caretaking search"' 63 for which no warrant would be
required.
Having determined that a warrant was not required, the Dombrowski
Court faced the issue of the general reasonableness of the search under
the fourth amendment. However, it was evident that once fitted within the
158. Id. at 447.
159. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
160. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
It should also be noted that the Dombrowski Court emphasized the fact that
the search in Cooper was to safeguard the police who were holding the vehicle. See
text accompanying note 158 supra. However, this factor was mentioned only in pass-
ing by the Cooper Court and was not the subject of extensive discussion. See text
accompanying note 133 supra.
161. The Dombrowski Court described the fact situation of Harris in such a way
as to give one the mistaken belief that the evidence therein had been found in an
inventory. In essence, the Court stated that an inventory took place, that evidence
was found, and that the evidence was ruled admissible without noting that the evi-
dence had been found in a separate procedure. 413 U.S. at 445. While the Supreme
Court did not make this distinction overwhelmingly clear in its per curiam Harris
opinion, a close reading will reveal that to be the basis of the decision. See notes
139-45 and accompanying text supra. In addition, there can be little doubt upon the
issue when the opinion is read in conjunction with that of the court it affirmed, Harris
v. United States, 370 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam). As a result, it would
appear that the present Supreme Court is inclined toward rewriting Harris to point
in new directions.
162. 413 U.S. at 447-48. The Court also referred to its previous comment about
the difference between cars and houses. Id. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
163. The Dombrowski Court used this term in describing the search for the weapon
that police reasonably believed to be in the vehicle. 413 U.S. 447-48.
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new exception to the warrant requirement, there was little doubt as to the
ultimate reasonableness of the search. With little consideration of such
factors as the alternative methods of protecting the vehicle that were avail-
able,' 6 4 or the validity of the searching officer's belief that a revolver was
located in the defendant's car, the Court simply stated:
Where, as here, the trunk of an automobile, which the officer reason-
ably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals,
we hold that the search was not "unreasonable" within the meaning of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 10 5
The factor which enabled the Dombrowski Court to uphold a warrant-
less search of an immbolized vehicle without probable cause was, appar-
ently, the quasi-administrative' 66 nature of the procedure. This would
explain the Court's emphasis of the purpose of the procedure while generally
ignoring its necessity and scope. Such an analysis is also supported by the
Dombrowski Court's reliance upon Harris and Cooper, both of which
involved intrusions for noninvestigative, protective purposes.
It has been contended that warrants should not be required in this
quasi-administrative area of police procedure since they would be im-
possible to obtain.16 7 Stated more clearly, the argument recognizes a public
need, arising from other than the criminal- law, which would require an
intrusion into privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment. Since
the warrant procedure is geared to probable cause of a crime, police would
be unable to fulfill this public need through the warrant requirement. 68
However, the existence of a public need does not necessarily require an
exception to the warrant requirement. 169 Moreover, it may be possible to
164. While the Court mentioned the possibility of posting a police guard in
metropolitan areas where manpower might be available, this observation appeared to
pertain only to the Court's consideration of the warrant issue. Id. at 447. Even if
the Court was speaking of reasonableness in general, it pursued this issue no further
except to state, "The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract,
have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search
unreasonable." Id., citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
165. 413 U.S. at 448.
166. This term is used in a descriptive, rather than technical manner. In essence,
several cases seem to suggest that different treatment is accorded intrusions for
purposes other than that of searching for evidence or contraband. These other pur-
poses have included insulation from tort claims (see notes 57-68 and accompanying
text supra), protection of property (see notes 69-87 and accompanying text supra)
and public safety (see notes 90-97 and accompanying text supra). Since the objec-
tive is not to investigate crime but the result may be seizure of contraband or evi-
dence, these intrusions may be fairly described as quasi-administrative.
167. Comment, supra note 3, at 850-51. See Mozzetti v. Supreme Court, 4 Cal.
3d 699, 711, 484 P.2d 84, 92, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 420 (1971).
168. Comment, supra note 3, at 851.
169. In relation to administrative housing inspections, the Court stated in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) :
The question is not, at this stage at least, whether these inspections may be made,
but whether they may be made without a warrant. For example, to say that
gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of the police without a warrant
is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never be made. In assessing
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obtain administrative search warrants based upon reasonable administrative
or legislative standards.170 Thus, there is an alternative to creating an
exception to the warrant requirement in order to accommodate the factual
situation of Dombrowski or that of the inventory search of an impounded
vehicle.
The Court's conclusion that the warrantless search was reasonable
may also be criticized. Despite the Court's finding that the automobile
was vulnerable to vandals, 17 1 the fact situation of Dombrowski was not
particularly compelling. The search for the gun was made after 2 a.m. in
the locked trunk of a vehicle stored at an isolated, rural service station. 1
72
If these facts made the search reasonable, it would be hard to imagine a
situation in which an automobile trunk could not be searched, given a sus-
picion that it contained a weapon. It might be argued that because the car
had been involved in an accident there was an additional reason to search.
An automobile which has been in an accident may require a greater amount
of protection if its windows and locks were broken. Such was not the case
in Dombrowski, at least as far as the trunk was concerned, because the
Court noted that the trunk of the car had been locked before the searching
officer opened it.17a Therefore, the danger that someone would remove the
gun from the trunk was not increased by the fact that an accident had
occurred. Similarly, the danger does not seem to have been appreciably
greater than that presented by a gun in the trunk of any car not under
police control.
Therefore, the only substantial basis upon which the search could
have been justified was the contention that once police had impounded the
auto, they had a duty, whether from bailment law or otherwise, to protect
defendant's goods from larceny and the public from dangers presented by
some of these goods. Yet it does not seem that the police actually im-
pounded the car. A private garage had towed and stored the car.174 The
Court said merely, "[T]he police had exercised a form of custody or
control over the 1967 Thunderbird."'175
As a result, there was no imminent danger to the public in Dombrowski
from vandals poised to strip the deadly contents of a vulnerable auto-
mobile. Neither was there a bailee's duty in the police to protect the contents
whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search should
be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search.
Id. at 533, citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
170. Id. at 538. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (border searches).
171. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
172. 413 U.S. at 436-37.
173. Id. at 437.
174. Id. at 436.
175. Id. at 442-43 (emphasis added).
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of the vehicle because they did not have possession. 176 If the Court could
uphold a search under these circumstances, it is not a large step to validate
the inventory process. The lone substantial factual distinction is the pres-
ence in Dombrowski of a reasonable belief that the automobile contained a
weapon 177 -such a reasonable belief would not normally be present in
the ordinary inventory search process. However, additional public interests
which apparently arise when police actually impound a vehicle, such as the
protection of the owner's property and the prevention of tort claims against
police for conversion of goods inside such vehicles, might be adequate sub-
stitutes and, therefore, justify an inventory.
In addition, the Dombrowski Court's analysis of the law would also
seem to support the inventory procedure. 178 The mitigating facts and lim-
ited holdings of Harris and Caoper79 were largely ignored in Dombrowski.
The Court seemed to reinterpret Harris and Cooper by emphasizing certain
facts common to each case: 1) an immobilized vehicle was searched without
probable cause; 2) the purpose of the intrusion was to protect the owner's
property or the police in some fashion and not to seize evidence; 3) the
evidence revealed by these intrusions was ultimately found admissible. The
result, apparently, is a new exception to the warrant requirement for quasi-
administrative intrusions into vehicles in police custody.
There is little question that the inventory search can be interpreted to
fit within this exception. Several of the stated purposes of the inventory
procedure - protecting private property, the police, and the public against
weapons secreted inside impounded automobiles - have been accepted by
the Court as meriting the exception.' 80 In addition, it is likely that the
inventory, as a quasi-administrative procedure used to protect various
public interests, could be found reasonable under the rule of Dombrowski.
The Supreme Court thus approached the logical conclusion of a trend
that began with Cooper, in which five justices ruled that a warrantless
search without probable cause pursuant to a forfeiture proceeding was
somehow more reasonable than a search for evidence.' 8' With Cooper as
a basis, successive innovations have followed easily. The Court has ob-
scured the direction of and gaps in such reasoning by concentrating upon
the reasonableness of various police practices and avoiding a consideration
of the reasonableness of the resulting incursions into the privacy interests
176. Since police did not have possession, they could not have been considered
gratuitous or involuntary bailees. See note 57 supra.
177. 413 U.S. at 448.
178. Several courts have relied upon Dombrowski to uphold inventories. State v.
Gowons, 109 Ariz. 521, 514 P.2d 443 (1973); People v. Trusty, ___ Colo . 516
P.2d 423 (1973); St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 218 N.W.2d 697 (1974) ; State
v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 388, 524 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1974); State v. Lund, 10 Wash. App.
709, 519 P.2d 1325 (Ct. App. 1974). But see United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468
(8th Cir. 1973) ; Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Va. 1974).
179. See notes 131-37, 140-45 and accompanying text supra.
180. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
181. See notes 130-34 and accompanying text supra. 32
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of the individual. Only by looking at one side of the coin has the Court
been able to maintain the structure of a fourth amendment inquiry.
As an alternative, the trend of Cooper, as followed through Dom-
browski, could be regarded as a reaction to the technological innovation
and proliferation of the automobile. In Carrdll, the Court created an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement because of the impracticality of obtaining a
warrant for a moving vehicle.18 2 Going beyond mere alteration in the factual
circumstances in which an automobile search will be ruled reasonable under
the fourth amendment, the Court could rule forthrightly that one has
little or no right to privacy in his automobile.1 8 3  Although Katz v.
United States84 is to the contrary, it is possible to regard the prolifera-
tion and necessity of automobiles in today's society plus the many "care-
taking" functions of police in regard to automobiles as justifying such a
result. Momentous as such a decision would be, it is a more logical
explanation of the trend expressed in Dombrowski and the effect might not
be significantly greater. When all cars can be inventoried for beneficent
purposes, there will be no need for evidentiary searches.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Cady v. Dombrowski, the Supreme Court narrowly avoided the
inventory search issue'85 while creating a sound legal basis for this type
of procedure. To do this, the Court reinterpreted several cases, 86 and
created, or at least formulated, a new exception to the warrant require-
ment 8 7 while spinning out of a less than compelling fact situation a cogniz-
able public interest in the search.' 88 In the process, the Court endorsed
several of the justifications generally presented for inventory searches.
While Dombrowski did not expressly validate inventory searches, it would
be difficult to imagine a case that could have come closer.
Courts upholding inventory searches tend to consider this sort of stand-
ard operating procedure with a view toward determining whether or not it
reasonably aids police in protecting property or avoiding claims for conver-
sion of goods allegedly taken from impounded vehicles. They give scant
consideration to the individual's fourth amendment interest of privacy in his
personal effects - a factor which must be balanced against these other
interests. 8 9 Even if one were to assume that general police interests in
protecting property or avoiding tort claims weigh equally with the indi-
vidual's right of privacy, a close analysis of the necessity for and scope of
the inventory procedure must be undertaken.
182. See notes 100-05 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 155 and accompanying text supra.
184. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
185. It is possible to conclude that the Court failed to rule upon the inventory
issue only because it was presented in an awkward manner. See note 152 supra.
186. See notes 160-61 and accompanying text supra.
187. See notes 162-63 and accompanying text supra.
188. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 22 & 33 supra.
COMMENT
33
Hall: The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
An examination of the policy bases behind inventory procedures re-
veals that in most situations an inventory search, especially one of unlimited
scope, is not necessary to protect the owner's property, to insulate the police
from tort claims, or to shield the public from explosives or weapons which
may be secreted inside impounded automobiles. 190 In addition, the reason-
ableness of the inventory under the fourth amendment bears an inverse
relationship with the scope of the search.'
In Dombrowski the Court brought a measure of order to the chaos
of automobile searches. But it went far towards validating the inventory
search - a procedure whose regulation is marked by catchword justifica-
tions as well as by the astounding lack of reflection which most courts have
displayed in dealing with these justifications. Order has been achieved by
imposing upon the area a simplistic analytical overlay which, it is submitted,
ignores individual privacy interests. Although it appears unlikely, this
trend must be reversed if the fourth amendment is to retain meaningful
application to automobiles in the area of quasi-administrative intrusions
into areas of a car not in plain view.
Robert M. Hall
APPENDIX
I. States where cases have consistently held inventory searches of areas not in plain
view to be valid.
In the following cases, inventory searches have been recognized as valid under
the fourth amendment since they were not merely subterfuges for warrantless
searches but rather were legitimate means to protect the owner's property and to
protect the police from false tort claims; Boulet v. State, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168
(1973), vacating, Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972) (not neces-
sary for police to have no hope or expectation of finding something incriminating in
inventory) ; People v. Trusty -..... Colo ........ 516 P.2d 423 (1973) (interpreting Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)) ; Denson v. State, 128 Ga. App. 456, 197 S.E.2d
156 (1973) (heroin found inside envelope) ; State v. Undorf, 210 Kan. 1, 499 P.2d
1105 (1972) (quoting with approval United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971)); St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 218
N.W.2d 697 (1974) (basing decision primarily upon Dombrowski); State v. Arm-
strong, 149 Mont. 470, 428 P.2d 611 (1967) (possibly an alternative holding) ; State
v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970) (alter-
native holding; see also State v. Jones, 122 N.J. Super. 585, 301 A.2d 185 (Dist. Ct.
1973)) ; State v. All, 17 N.C. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 770 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973) ; State v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 388, 524 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1974) (overruling
State v. Newrod, 85 N.M. 118, 509 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1973)) ; State v. Criscola, 21
Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 570, 184 S.E.2d
781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
190. See section II-D supra.
191. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
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Delaware adheres to the unusual rule that police may inventory closed areas of
an automobile in police custody, but may not search closed parcels found therein.
State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. 1973). Case law suggests, although it does not
require, a similar rule in Oklahoma. In Embree v. State, 488 P.2d 588 (Ct. Crim.
App. Okla. 1971), marijuana found by police in defendant's automobile was found
inadmissible because the search warrant was invalid, the search was not incident to
the arrest, there was no probable cause, the vehicle was no longer mobile, and the
intrusion could not be justified as a police inventory, citing for the last proposition
Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
However, in Bennet v. State, 507 P.2d 1252 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 1973), the court
interpreted Einbree as a mere search warrant case and limited the rule of Mozzetti
to intrusions into closed parcels. Id. at 1254. The Bennet court went on to uphold
an inventory which revealed marijuana under a floor mat and in the glove compartment.
Id. at 1255. It has also been held by an Oklahoma court that an officer may not
delegate his duty to make an inventory to a tow truck driver. State v. Shorney, 524
P.2d 69 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 1974). Recently, an inventory in which evidence
leading to conviction was discovered in defendant's trunk was upheld as a reasonable
search, the court citing Bennet and Mozzetti. Fruit v. State, 528 P.2d 331, 334 & n.3
(Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 1974).
Florida has been one of the more consistent advocates of the inventory process.
See Roush v. State, 203 So. 2d 632 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967). However, in uphold-
ing inventory process, one Florida case contained extraneous overtones of search
incident to arrest, Gagnon v. State, 212 So. 2d 337, 399 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968),
while another seemed to suggest that police custody was a sufficient justification,
Knight v. State, 212 So. 2d 900 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968). The limits placed upon
the inventory search by its protective nature were overlooked in Godbee v. State,
224 So. 2d 441 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969). There the court upheld an inventory in
which police broke the locks of a car impounded two days earlier and found stolen
goods. Id. at 442. However, an inventory will not be allowed where it was performed
against usual police practice. State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1974).
Anticipating the inventory issue in Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1970),
the court ruled that the process was valid when made as a good faith effort to protect
property rather than to search for evidence. Id. at 399. The court went on to approve
the admission into evidence of marijuana found above the sun visor and inside the air
breather atop the carburetor, despite the unlikelihood that the latter location would
be used to store valuables, although it remanded to the lower court upon other grounds
for a new trial. Id. at 397. On appeal of the same case after retrial, the court was
squarely presented with the inventory issue and upheld the intrusion. Jackson v.
State, 261 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1972).
An inventory search in Nevada was upheld in Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423
P.2d 666 (1967), where the court noted that if police conduct indicated that their
intention was exploratory, rather than protective, the search would be unreasonable.
Id. at 103-04, 423 P.2d at 668. Subsequently, the defendant sought habeas corpus
relief which was denied by the district court on the grounds that the search was valid
as one incident to an arrest; the Ninth Circuit reversed upon this issue, noting that
the inventory question was not pressed on appeal. Heffley v. Hocker, 420 F.2d 881,
885 n.8 (9th Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit's opinion was vacated and remanded by
the Supreme Court to be considered in light of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), Hocker v. Heffley, 399 U.S. 521 (1970) (per curiam), after which the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the conviction. Heffley v. Hocker, 429 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1970).
Despite the irrelevance of these federal cases to the inventory issue, the Nevada courts
have dealt with the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Heffley in an inconsistent
manner, sometimes appearing to doubt the validity of Heffley. See Wright v. State,
88 Nev. 460, 499 P.2d 1216 (1972) ; Shepp v. State, 87 Nev. 179, 484 P.2d 563 (1971) ;
Scott v. State, 86 Nev. 145, 465 P.2d 620 (1970). The better interpretation is that
Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967), is still good law in Nevada.
In Washington, an inventory to protect property against destruction and police
against tort claims, rather than as a subterfuge for an exploratory search, was upheld
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in State v. Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968). The lower courts of
that state have strained to uphold this procedure under less than compelling circum-
stances. See State v. Patterson, 8 Wash. App. 177, 504 P.2d 1197 (1973) (police
completed inventory without finding anything, but then searched under dashboard after
a pistol fell from beneath the dashboard when tow truck driver sat in driver's seat) ;
State v. Jones, 2 Wash. App. 627, 472 P.2d 402 (1970) (search not valid as one in-
cident to an arrest under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1962), but valid as an
inventory). However, the automobile must be properly impounded for there to be
an inventory, a requirement that is not satisfied when a car is parked in a legal park-
ing space and the driver is arrested for an offense which is easily bailable, implying
only a temporary absence from the car. State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 332-34,
511 P.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (1973). In addition, evidence obtained is inadmissible unless
there has been a good faith attempt to find, list, and secure all of the personal property
in the automobile, not just the property which is incriminatory. State v. Gluck, 83
Wash. 2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974). In State v. Lund, 10 Wash. App. 709, 519 P.2d
1325 (1974), the defendant informed police that there was a gun in a car with broken
locks which was parked on a route used by school children. Id. at 710, 519 P.2d at
1326. The court upheld the admissibility of marijuana found in the search for the gun,
citing as controlling authority Dombrowski. Id. at 712, 519 P.2d at 1327.
In St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (Ct. Spec. App. 1967), the court
suggested that an inventory might not be a search for purposes of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 612, 232 A.2d at 469. MacKall v. State, 7 Md. App. 246, 255 A.2d 98 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1969), interpreted St. Clair as holding that an inventory is not a search. Id. at 251,
255 A.2d at 101. However, an inventory is unreasonable if the car is parked safely
and the driver's absence will be temporary since the danger of property loss is lessened.
See Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974) ; Kleinbart
v. State, 2 Md. App. 183, 234 A.2d 288 (Ct. Spec. App. 1967).
The Nebraska court ruled that an inventory is not a search for purposes of the
fourth amendment, although the inventory must be justifiable as a bona fide inventory
and not as an excuse for a warrantless search, in State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173
N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970). Police found gambling material in a
vanity box located in the trunk and glove compartment of defendant's automobile.
185 Neb. at 46, 173 N.W.2d at 374.
In New York, the admissibility of a loaded pistol found inside a brief case con-
tained in an illegally parked car was upheld in People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272
N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971). Initially, the court cited the necessity for a
towaway program (noticeably skirting the issue of necessity for the inventory) appar-
ently to infer that the procedure involved was somewhat different from that concern-
ing cars held as evidence. Id. at 71, 272 N.E.2d at 465, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47.
Relying on a tentative draft of the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
(Code), the court ruled that the inventory was not a search. Using the Code's defini-
tion of "search," the court concluded that there must be a direct nexus between the
inventory and an intent to prosecute in order for the intrusion to become a "search"
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 77, 272 N.E.2d at 469, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 952,
citing MODEl. CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art. 1, § SS1.01, subd. [11
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970). Where the intent of an officer is to look for contraband,
rather than to protect property, the intrusion is a search. People v. Rivera, 72 Misc.
2d 307, 399 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Crim. Ct. 1972).
In State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969), police found
evidence of a crime when they opened the trunk of a wrecked car in order to find
the service revolver believed to be carried by the driver, a Chicago policeman. Id. at
493-94, 171 N.W.2d at 353. Noting that the standard procedure of police was to look
in such automobiles to protect the owner's property (in effect an inventory), the
court ruled that there had been no search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 496-97, 171 N.W.2d at 354-55. Subsequent cases in this state have dealt
with the inventory issue in an inconsistent manner. See Soehle v. State, 60 Wis. 2d
72, 82 & n.16, 208 N.W.2d 341, 347 & n.16 (1973) (inventory concept not applied to
apparently appropriate factual circumstances). See also Warrix v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 36
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368, 184 N.W.2d 189 (1971); Lopez v. State. 53 Wis. 2d 662, 193 N.W.2d 874, cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972); State v. McCarty, 47 Wis. 2d 781, 177 N.W.2d 819 (1970).
II. Jurisdictions tending to support the validity of inventory searches.
The District of Columbia courts have consistently recognized the rule that inven-
tory searches of cars lawfully in police custody conducted with the purpose of pro-
tecting the owner's property and shielding the police from tort claims are reason-
able under the fourth amendment. Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123, 124-25
(D.C. 1971); Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837, 839-40 (D.C. 1971) ; United
States v. Pannell, 256 A.2d 925, 926 (D.C. 1969). But just as consistently, these
courts found the means to invalidate each inventory search case presented to them.
In Pannell, the court ruled the inventory unconstitutional because there was no need
to impound the car; defendant had been arrested for a minor traffic violation and the
car had been legally parked. 256 A.2d at 926. Since the officer acted inconsistently
with a protective intent in Pigford, the inventory was ruled exploratory in that case.
273 A.2d at 840. Even with a valid impoundment in Mayfield, the court ruled that
the temporary absence caused by the minor traffic violation involved made the inven-
tory unnecessary and unreasonable. 276 A.2d at 125.
In Kentucky, there is some case law to the effect that contraband found in a
vehicle under police care is admissible under the fourth amendment. Cole v. Com-
monwealth, 201 Ky. 543, 257 S.W. 713 (1924); Patrick v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky.
83, 250 S.W. 507 (1923). But all subsequent interpretations of these cases have rele-
gated them to the search incident to arrest area. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phillips,
224 Ky. 117, 5 S.W.2d 887 (1928).
In People v. Willis, 46 Mich. App. 436, 208 N.W.2d 204 (1973), the Michigan
Court of Appeals noted "by way of dictum" that an inventory might not be a search
in the constitutional sense and that even if it were a search, it was probably reason-
able. Id. at 440-41, 208 N.W.2d at 206.
III. States in which it has been held that inventories are unreasonable searches.
The court found that an inventory extending beyond items in plain view was
unreasonable in Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr.
412 (1971). Overruling a series of lower court decisions, the California court held
that police went far beyond what was necessary to protect the contents of defendant's
suitcase and noted that mere custody of the car did not create a right to search it.
Id. at 706-11, 484 P.2d at 88-91, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416-19. The tort claim justification
was dismissed upon the basis that police, as involuntary bailees, are obliged to exercise
only slight care, "In no case is an inventory of items not within plain sight essential
to safeguard the contents or to fulfill a 'slight' duty of care." Id. at 708-09, 484 P.2d
at 89-90, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18. An inventory is an unreasonable search even when
made to protect the contents of an arrestee's automobile, which is to be left in a high
crime district late at night after owner has requested that the vehicle and contents
not be taken into custody. People v. Miller, 7 Cal. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr.
860 (1972).
It has been ruled unnecessary and therefore unreasonable in Oregon for police
to make a protective inventory of a tackle box. State v. Keller, 265 Ore. 622, 510
P.2d 568 (1973), rev'g, 9 Ore. App. 613, 497 P.2d 868 (1972) and overruling State
v. Raiford, 7 Ore. App. 421, 490 P.2d 1036 (1971). The Supreme Court's ruling in
Keller appears to extend not only to closed packages, but also to areas not in plain
view. See State v. Walden, 15 Ore. App. 259, 515 P.2d 407 (1973) ; State v. Childers,
13 Ore. App. 622, 511 P.2d 447 (1973).
IV. State cases suggesting that inventory searches are invalid.
In Maine, a court declared an inventory to be a search and seemed to view the
process with some disfavor, although it specifically reserved the issue of an inventory's
reasonableness. State v. Richards, 296 A.2d 129, 138 n.8 (Me. 1972). In State v.
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Eaton, 504 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. 1973), the Missouri court declined to uphold a search as
an inventory, choosing instead probable cause as a basis of justification. Id. at 18-19.
In the process, the Missouri court cited with approval United States v. Lawson, 487
F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973), the leading court of appeals case holding inventory searches
violative of the fourth amendment. 504 S.W.2d at 19. Lawson also proved instructive
to the court in State v. Catlette, S.D -. , 221 N.W.2d 25 (1974). There the
court appeared to lean toward the position that only an inventory of areas in plain
view is permissible. However, the court did not need to reach this issue since it found
that the primary intent of the officer was to search for evidence rather than to protect
property. Id. at ------------, 221 N.W.2d at 28-29.
V. United States Circuit Courts of Appeals with holdings upon the inventory issue.
A. Fifth Circuit
Early cases within this jurisdiction are of a mixed and contradictory character.
In a border search case, the court stated:
A search implies an examination of one's premises or person with a view to the
discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal
action. The term implies exploratory investigation or quest.
Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957) (dictum). Twelve years
later, the Fifth Circuit ruled inadmissible evidence found during an inventory of an
abandoned car of which the defendant denied ownership or knowledge. Williams v.
United States, 412 F.2d 729 (1969). However, both Haerr and Williavi have been
isolated and by-passed by later decisions of the Fifth Circuit.
The germinal case of United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971), involved the inventory of a suitcase found in de-
fendant's hotel room and an inventory of his car. The court found that police had a
duty to take possession of goods in the hotel room and to inventory the contents of
the suitcase for safekeeping. 435 F.2d at 799-80. Using a similar safekeeping rationale
and citing another decision that permitted police to inspect the vehicle identification
number of automobiles under certain circumstances, United States v. Johnson, 431
F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc), the Lipscomb court upheld the automobile inven-
tory as a protective, rather than exploratory, measure. 435 F.2d at 801.
Johnson allowed police to examine vehicle identification numbers, positing that
the owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to his car's identification
number. 431 F.2d at 441. Nothing was found in the car inventory in Lipsconb except
the vehicle identification number, which indicated that the car was stolen. Since this
revelation was arguably within the bounds of Johnson, it is possible to regard the
Lipscomb court's discussion of automobile inventories as mere dictum. However, this
argument has not been recognized by the Fifth Circuit.
In subsequent cases, the Fifth Circuit generally upheld the right of police to
inventory closed areas of automobiles and sealed packages as a means of protecting
the owners' property and the police from tort claims when the inventories are not
used as subterfuges for evidentiary searches. United States v. Ducker, 491 F.2d 1190
(5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1135 (1974); United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Pennington,
441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Boyd,
436 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Cf. United States v. Grill, 484 F.2d
990 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974) (inventory of suitcase upon
which IRS filed a lien held valid). In essence, the Fifth Circuit has taken the doc-
trine to its logical conclusiop: the routine inventory of a lawfully impounded vehicle
is a separate, alternative and complete exception to the warrant requirement and will be
held reasonable under the fourth amendment unless exploratory intent is clearly proven.
It is submitted, however, that application of the inventory search doctrine within
the Fifth Circuit has, at times, approached absurdity. See Lowe v. Caldwell, 367
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F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Ga. 1973), in which the court found that police were justified in
opening an envelope and reading the letter therein, in order to protect the defendant's
property interest. Id. at 53. The court labelled "hair-splitting" the argument that
police should have obtained a warrant before opening the envelope found in defendant's
auto. Id. at 53 n.1l.
B. Eighth Circuit
Giving a narrow reading to Dombrowski, the court held inventory searches
violative of the 'fourth amendment in United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th
Cir. 1973). In so doing, the Lawson Court considered various aspects and justifica-
tions of the inventory issue. First, the court rejected the argument that an inventory
is not a search, stating that such a highly technical construction violated the spirit,
if not the letter, of the law as expressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 487 F.2d at 472. Next, it ques-
tioned the contention that an inventory gave police more protection against tort claims
than other procedures involving less intrusion. Id. at 476. According to the court, the
fact that the inventory was a routine practice, performed in accordance with a
police regulation should be irrelevant. Id. at 475. The court recognized that the rea-
sonableness of the procedure, as determined by a balancing of interests, should be the
controlling element rather than the court's subjective view of reasonable police
procedures. Id. at 477. As a result, the court held that in normal circumstances, an
inventory search is not necessary to protect the owner's property from loss or the
police from tort claims, and that, in any case, the procedure is usually an unreason-
able intrusion upon the owner's fourth amendment right of privacy. Id.
VI. Federal circuits having no direct holding upon the question of inventory searches.
A. First Circuit
The courts within this circuit have thus far avoided the inventory issue. At least
one commentator has cited Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1964),
for the proposition that an inventory to protect property inside an automobile is not
a search, at least for purposes of the fourth amendment. Comment, Warrantless
Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REv. 835, 849 & n.69 (1974). In
Fagundes the officer noted evidence in plain view while attempting to protect the
contents of a disabled car from rain pouring through a broken window. 340 F.2d at
674. Not commenting upon the officer's intrusion into the automobile, the court ruled
that it was not a search for one to observe that which was in plain view. Id. at 676.
Because there was no inventory and the evidence was in plain view, it is submitted
that Fagundes is not authority for the proposition that an inventory is not a search.
The resolution of the issues posed by a factual situation similar to that in Fagundes
should be controlled by Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), which held
admissible evidence found while an officer was rolling up windows and locking doors
of an automobile in police custody as a protective measure.
B. Seventh Circuit
The court in United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 888 (1972), ruled that the examination of a vehicle identification number was
a mere check upon the identification of the car and not a search. 457 F.2d at 830.
While purporting to distinguish United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.
1966), Ware effectively overruled this prior case. 457 F.2d at 829-30.
The significance of the vehicle identification number examination for the issues
discussed in this Comment is that a court's disposition of the vehicle number issue
tends to reflect its orientation in the general area of vehicle intrusions which are not
necessarily evidentiary, but which may lead to prosecution depending upon what is
found. However, the usefulness of the connection between inspection of a vehicle
identification number and an inventory of the vehicle is skewed by two factors, each
cutting in an opposite direction. First, theoretically a check of the vehicle identifica-
COMMENT
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tion number is more consciously aligned with a possible violation of the law than an
inventory" search. On the other hand, viewing the vehicle identification number would
seem to be quantitatively, if not qualitatively, a lesser intrusion into one's expectation
of privacy than an inventory of closed areas and sealed parcels. In any case, Ware
would seem to indicate that the Seventh Circuit is favorably inclined toward making
a distinction between "administrative inspections" and the more traditional search
for evidence or contraband.
C. Tenth Circuit
Little precedent upon the inventory search issue is available from the decisions
arising out of the Tenth Circuit. Without a great deal of discussion, the court held
that the warrantless examination of a vehicle identification number was an unreason-
able search in Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). In dictum,
a district court rejected the claim that an inventory of an impounded vehicle is neces-
sary to protect the officer from false tort claims. Dodge v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285,
291 (D. Utah 1967). Although the precise question of whether inventories are valid,
has not been answered, it appears that the Tenth Circuit does not favor searches in
the administrative mold.
VII. Federal courts with conflicting decisions upon the inventory problem or holdings
upon related issues.
A. Second Circuit
The only case on point within this jurisdiction is United States v. Smith, 340
F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1972), where the court held that a search was valid either
as one with probable cause or as a valid routine inventory to protect the contents of
the car and to guard against later claims of loss or theft. Id. at 1028. See United
States v. Capra, 372 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), wherein security men for the
Penn Central were unable to open luggage that they suspected to contain explosives.
In an "informal" manner, local detectives were called in to open the locks and nar-
cotics were found. Id. at 107-08. Citing Dombrowski, the court ruled that the con-
traband was admissible because the actions of the detectives did not constitute an
intrusion with exploratory intent to which the fourth amendment was meant to apply.
372 F. Supp. at 608-09.
B. Third Circuit
In a cautious opinion, the court in United States ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347
F. Supp. 989 (D.N.J. 1972), held admissible contraband observed in plain view
when an officer opened the defendant's car door to begin an inventory. Id. at 992.
Analogizing from the inventory search cases of the Fifth Circuit, a district court
upheld the inventory of a wallet discovered in plain view inside an impounded auto-
mobile. United States v. Young, 369 F. Supp. 540 (D. Del. 1974).
C. Fourth Circuit
Noting that neither custody, a duty to protect property located in an impounded
vehicle, nor the remote danger of tort claims, especially in light of available alterna-
tives, was sufficient justification, the court in Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp.
690 (E.D. Va. 1974), declared that an inventory of the contents of a locked trunk
was patently unreasonable; Dombrowski was limited to its facts. Id. at 698-701.
In Powers v. United States, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
1011 (1971), a vehicle number examination was upheld. 439 F.2d at 376. The court,
in effect, adopted the "reasonable suspicion" test of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
439 F.2d at 376.
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D. Sixth Circuit
The cases within this jurisdiction seem somewhat contradictory upon the issue
of the validity of inventory searches. The Court of Appeals has ruled that examin-
ing a vehicle identification number is not a search even if the police have probable
cause to believe that the car was stolen. United States v. Graham, 391 F.2d 439, 443
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 941 (1968). However, the court does not appear
to be inclined toward extending this doctrine to include inventory searches of im-
pounded cars. Cf. Lewis v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 467, 471 n.6 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Although police have the right to inventory
goods in an arrestee's hotel room, it is not entirely clear whether or not this intrusion
is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment. Compare United States v. Black-
burn, 389 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1968) (notebook and pistol found in defendants' hotel
room following their arrest held admissible because they were discovered pursuant to
standard police procedure to place arrestee's belongings in a safe place), with United
States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 985 (1970)
(second inventory conducted at police station consisting of search of defendant's suit-
case held valid as a continuation of inventory of property belonging to persons taken
into custody).
In United States v. Gerlach, 350 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Mich. 1972), police im-
pounded and inventoried a vehicle blocking a small parking lot. The court found that
the contraband discovered was admissible since it was the product of a routine, non-
exploratory procedure designed to protect defendant's property. Id. at 183. Justifying
its decision, the court declared:
Because the keys were left in the vehicle, it was in the interest of the defendant
and police to inventory all property in places that were open or could be opened
through the use of the keys. No locks were forced.
Id. at 183. Since the police could have removed the car, locked it, and retained the
keys, the court failed to explain why the presence of the keys in the car or the fact
that no locks were forced validated the inventory search.
In contrast, the court of appeals held unconstitutional the inventory of a car
being held at police direction by a service station owner who, apparently, could have
locked it in his garage. Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1972). Distinguish-
ing United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
980 (1971), where the automobile was held by police, the court stated: "There was
no reason to inventory the contents of the automobile .... ." 455 F.2d at 1231 (em-
phasis added). Apparently, the "reason" present in Lipscormb and absent in Williams
was physical possession by the police and its possible implications of a duty to protect
the owner's property, potential tort liability, and an ill-defined notion that police who
have possession of a car have a right to know its contents. In light of the conflicting
law in the Sixth Circuit, it is problematical what significance, if any, this distinction
will have in future cases.
E. Ninth Circuit
It was held in Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967), that an
inspection of the vehicle identification number was reasonable although the court was
"inclined" toward the view that such an intrusion is not a search. Id. at 393-94. In
dictum, the court expressed approval of the practice of impounding and making inven-
tories of automobiles in similar situations, but failed to clarify the permissible scope
of such inventories. Id. at 392.
In something of a watershed case because of its factual setting, the Ninth Circuit
held that police may seize evidence or contraband in plain view during the course
of an inventory to protect the owner's valuables and the police from tort claims.
United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972). After impounding defendant's
car, the officer observed watches on the front seat and floor around a paritally open
sample case. While putting the watches back in the case for safekeeping, the officer 41
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noticed a pistol inside the case. Id. at 960. Defendant was subsequently charged with
possession of a weapon by a felon. Id. at 961. It is submitted that this may be the
most extreme circumstances to which the plain view doctrine can be applied.
In the course of its opinion, the Mitchell court approved the inventory of goods
in plain view, but found it unnecessary to decide whether or not such intrusions are
searches. Id. at 961-63. The court specifically reserved the question of inventories
into closed parcels or areas of a car not in plain view. Id. at 962-63.
F. District of Columbia Circuit
In its first encounter with the subject, Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477
(1966) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam), the court
of appeals managed to sidestep the inventory issue. After impounding a car as evi-
dence, police made an inventory for valuables. The inventory complete, an officer
opened the right front door to roll up the window and lock the door. He then dis-
covered the evidence inside the doorjamb. 370 F.2d at 478. Since the evidence was
not found during an inventory, that issue was not decided. The court ruled that open-
ing the door of the impounded vehicle to roll up the window and lock the door was
not a search. Id. at 479. As a result, evidence falling into plain view during the
course of such a limited, protective measure was admissible. Since the Supreme Court
affirmed on the same basis, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per
curiam), it remains to be seen whether or not the greater intrusion of the inventory
search can be justified under this protection analysis.
A district court upheld an inventory search to protect valuables, rather than a
search for evidence of contraband, in United States v. Fuller, 277 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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